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Abstract: The rapid growth of digitization has made cybersecurity a critical area for 
corporations, markets, and governments. The rise in cybersecurity investments and 
sweeping changes in the regulatory environment raise new economic questions – related 
to the impacts of cybersecurity investments, innovations, and legislation – that are yet to 
be answered. Focusing on the limited supply of cybersecurity labor, which has fallen 
behind the large demand for cybersecurity, Essay 1 studies how cybersecurity labor 
impacts the value of major infrastructural cyber investments. Moving beyond the ways to 
leverage cyberinfrastructure and labor, Essay 2 sheds light on the impact of the increasing 
pressure to pursue development and innovation in the cybersecurity area. This essay 
examines the bottom-line value of a prevalent type of innovative initiatives, i.e., 
corporate venture capital (CVC) investment in cybersecurity startups. Essays 1 and 2 
heavily focus on the value proposition of cybersecurity investments in corporations. 
While both essays consider the cybersecurity legislation as exogenous variations 
instigating further demand for cybersecurity products and innovations, Essay 3 links a 
widely-adopted cybersecurity law, i.e., security breach notification law (SBNL), to the 
broader economic demand for general IT services. Compliance costs of cybersecurity 
legislation raise the barrier for general digitization initiatives, thus decreasing the demand 
for digitization and negatively impact general IT service providers, the main suppliers of 
digital goods and services. A difference-in-difference study examines how passages of 
SBNLs impact the employment of general IT service providers. Overall, the dissertation 
highlights a) the importance of cybersecurity labor in leveraging cybersecurity 
infrastructure, b) the business value of innovation in cybersecurity as an area that is 
predominantly believed to be costly but not value-generating, and c) the broader 
economic impacts of cybersecurity legislation. In doing so, the dissertation covers a wide 
range of institutional entities that both shape and are impacted by the cybersecurity 
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CHAPTER I: OVERVIEW 
Cybersecurity, the protection of information in bits, is essential to the digital economy. While 
digital technologies bring about convenience and higher productivity, the information in digitized 
formats is vulnerable to unauthorized access. From 2012 to 2018, the number of data breaches in 
the U.S. has doubled (Sen 2018). In the meantime, all fifty states in the U.S. passed security 
breach notification laws (SBNLs), which require organizations to publicly disclose data breaches. 
The rise in cyber threats and a more stringent regulatory environment coincide with a sharp 
increase in cybersecurity spending (Sen 2018). The dramatic changes in the cybersecurity 
landscape raise new economic questions beyond those in the existing cybersecurity literature. 
This three-essay dissertation addresses some of these questions related to cybersecurity 
investments, innovations, and legislation. 
Prior studies in cybersecurity have documented how various risk-mitigation mechanisms 
reduce risks on personal- (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; D'Arcy et al. 2009), organizational- (Angst et al. 
2017; Kwon and Johnson 2018), and macro-levels (Hui et al. 2017; Romanosky et al. 2011). On 
the economics side, empirical studies evaluate the stock market reactions toward data breaches 
(Cavusoglu et al. 2004; Gordon et al. 2011), as well as the business values of cybersecurity 
investments (Bose and Leung 2019; Gordon et al. 2010). Despite the growing literature, existing 
studies have not considered cybersecurity labor or innovations and instead have focused on 
commoditized cyber products and services. In addition, the broader economic impacts of 




Although cybersecurity investments create positive business values (Bose and Leung 2019; Chai 
et al. 2011; Gordon et al. 2010), the value generation mechanism and determinants of value 
heterogeneity are not clear. Since substantive cybersecurity investments are more effective in 
mitigating threats than symbolic adoptions (Angst et al. 2017) and recruitment of talents is a strong 
indicator of substantive initiatives, cybersecurity labor will play an important role in leveraging 
cybersecurity investments. The severe shortages of cybersecurity labor (Zadelhoff 2017) add to the 
criticalness of cybersecurity labor. Essay 1 therefore examines how cybersecurity labor impacts the 
value of cybersecurity investments (RQ1).  
Related to labor, cybersecurity innovation is also an area under dramatic change. At the forefront 
of cyber innovation, cybersecurity startups are among the most vibrant entrepreneurship, with venture 
capital (VC) funding in cybersecurity increasing at an astonishing rate (Peterson 2018). Essay 2 
focuses on a specific type of VC, corporate venture capitals (CVCs), which refer to minority equity 
investments made by established firms in entrepreneurial ventures. CVCs are innovation-oriented, 
where the investing firms learn from the startups (Ma 2019). Essay 2 determines how CVC 
investment in cybersecurity affects the value of the investing firm (RQ2).  
Essay 3 tackles a broader agenda and addresses the economic impacts of cybersecurity legislation 
toward general IT. While digitization necessitates cybersecurity reforms, firms engaging in 
digitization initiatives may be discouraged by the costs of such major changes. Therefore, it has 
become increasingly important to understand if concerns about the costs of cybersecurity stifle digital 
growth. Shocks induced by staggered passages of state-level security breach notification laws 
(SBNLs) provide a quasi-experimental setting to study this question. Since IT service firms are the 
main suppliers of digital goods and services, essay 3 studies how the enactment of SBNLs affects the 
employment of IT service providers (RQ3).  
The three essays will add to the literature on several fronts. Essay 1 highlights the important role 
of cybersecurity labor in leveraging cybersecurity investments, and links recent studies on the 
substantive use of security technology (Angst et al. 2017; Kwon and Johnson 2018) with studies on 
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the business value of cybersecurity investments (Bose and Leung 2019; Gordon et al. 2010). Essay 2 
unfolds the business value of innovation in cybersecurity as an area that is traditionally considered to 
be costly but not value-generating, thus extending cybersecurity literature beyond commoditized 
cyber products and services. Essay 3 provides fresh evidence related to the unintended and broader 
economic consequences of cybersecurity legislation and adds to the digital economics literature that 
has traditionally focused on cost reduction through digitization (Goldfarb and Tucker 2019). Table 
1.1 summarizes the research questions, theory, methods, and findings. While the three essays cover a 
wide range of topics in cybersecurity, they are inherently linked through the supply and demand of 
cybersecurity and that of general IT. Figure 1.1 presents an overview of the dissertation. 
Table 1.1. Overview 




Cybersecurity talents and 
cybersecurity investments 
 








How does cybersecurity labor 
impact the value of cybersecurity 
investment? 
 
How does CVC investment in 
cybersecurity impact the value of the 
investing firm? 
How does the enactment of 
SBNL impact employments by 
IT service firms? 
Theory Firm Legitimacy, BTOF 
 
Real options Supply and demand 
Methodology Instruments, Matching Fixed Effects Difference-in-differences 




collected from annual reports 
Financial variables: archival 
Cybersecurity talent: online social 
media 
 
CVC investments: Crunchbase 











a) Cybersecurity investments (CIs) 
create positive values as measured 
by Tobin’s 𝑞. 
 
b) CIs accompanied by security 
talent recruitments generate 
significantly higher gains. 
 
c) CIs are more profitable for 
underperforming firms (breached 
firms in industries with less frequent 
breaches) and overperforming firms 
(un-breached firms in industries 
with more frequent breaches). 
a) CVC investments in cybersecurity 
are associated with positive firm 
values as measured by Tobin’s 𝑞. 
 
b) CVC investments in cybersecurity 
are associated with higher values for 
IT firms. 
 
c) More recent cybersecurity CVCs 
(2013-2017) are associated with 
higher values. 
a) Employment by large and 
mature IT service providers 
decreases following 
enactments of state-level 
security breach notification 
laws. 
 
b) No significant impact on 
employment in smaller and 
younger IT service firms. 










CHAPTER II: CYBERSECURITY TALENT AND CYBERSECURITY 
INVESTMENTS1 
2.1 Introduction 
The rise of cybersecurity incidents has raised the broad-level visibility to cybersecurity issues 
and has significantly engaged top executives. Over time, cybersecurity has transformed from an 
operational level issue to a perennial strategic topic that engages key internal (e.g., executives) 
and external (e.g., stakeholders) agencies. Despite this strategic elevation of cybersecurity in 
corporations, the strategic value of investing in cybersecurity investments is yet to be fully 
understood. Absent such critical information about the strategic value of cybersecurity 
investments, the alerted executives may not have the right answers to champion for and 
incentivize those investments. Borrowing from the literature on strategic management (e.g., 
Wernerfelt 1995; Barney 2001) and the strategic value of IT (e.g., Wade and Hulland 2004; Wade 
and Nevo 2010), we contend that a clear understanding of the strategic value of cybersecurity 
investments requires answering three key questions.  First, it should be clarified whether the 
various forms of cybersecurity investments create long-term business impacts that extend beyond 
the less stable, short-term market reactions (Q1). The second question pertains to whether those 
investments create firm-specific benefits (Q2). Finally, the third question is related to the strategic 
contingencies of value creation by those investment (Q3). Ongoing research on the value of 
cybersecurity provides knowledge that can be instrumental in initiating a discussion about the 
strategic value of cybersecurity investments. Nonetheless, the answer to these three questions 
cannot be extrapolated from the existing research. 
                                                          
1 We thank the editors and anonymous reviewers at MIS Quarterly, and the participants at the 2018 AMCIS and 2018 
BigXII+ MIS Research Symposium. 
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The existing research on the value of cybersecurity investments (VCI) has aptly documented its 
preventive value (e.g., Kankanhalli et al. 2003; Kwon and Johnson 2014; Angst et al. 2017; Kwon 
and Johnson 2018). Moreover, there is evidence pointing to the business value of specific types of 
cybersecurity investments – e.g., investment in identity theft countermeasures (Bose and Leung 2013; 
Bose and Leung 2019) – but not the broader set of cybersecurity investments. There is also evidence 
regarding the short-term returns to the broader set of cybersecurity investments (e.g., Chai et al. 
2011). However, evidence regarding the long-term business impacts of the broader set of 
cybersecurity investments is lacking.  Further, although some evidence exists (e.g., Bose and Leung 
2019) about the forward-looking value of specific types of cybersecurity investments, it is not yet 
clear if those forward-looking assessments of value creation translate into durable impacts as shown 
in robust, book-keeping measures of value, such as return on assets (ROA) or return on sales (ROS). 
Therefore, empirical evidence that can directly answer Q1 is still lacking. Since the literature does not 
offer a direct answer to Q1, information about the specificity of the durable value of the cybersecurity 
investments (Q2) and the contingencies of the created value (Q3) is also lacking. 
To answer these questions, we start by recognizing that although investments in cybersecurity do 
not appear to have an immediate pathway to profit, due to their risk-reducing nature and general 
treatment as an expense (Gordon and Loeb 2002), the legitimacy view (Bitektine and Haack 2015; 
Ginzel et al. 1993; Suchman 1995) can explain the strategic rewards gained from these investments. 
This view explains the impact of these investments through earned legitimacy,  elevated levels of 
market trust, and subsequently, lower costs of accessing equity and debt, which hereafter we refer to 
as the cost of capital (Arthur 2003; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Doh et al. 2010; Ho et al. 2017). The 
legitimacy view ties cybersecurity investments into a strategic source of impacting a firm’s value, i.e., 
stakeholders, and a critical resource that impacts the competitive survival of the firm, i.e., capital. 
Because stakeholders are external observers of the firm and require the public transmission of 
7 
 
information about cybersecurity investments, we build on the previous literature (Gordon et al. 20102) 
to argue that publicly emphasizing cybersecurity investments (PECIs) creates legitimacy rents for a 
firm by reducing its significant risks and lowering the cost of capital. Then, to further understand the 
heterogeneity in such rents, we build on the core tenet of the legitimacy view: “legitimacy is a 
generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions,” 
(Suchman 1995, p. 574; emphasis added). This widely accepted definition of legitimacy (Bansal and 
Roth 2000; Bitektine and Haack 2015; Mitchell et al. 1997; Suddaby and Greenwood 2005) 
highlights the elements of desirability and relative value as the main characteristics of actions that 
boost legitimacy. 
In the context of cybersecurity, the strategic desirability of PECIs is determined by their 
effectiveness in mitigating firm-specific cyber risk and security breaches. Cybersecurity talent is 
essential to turn general-purpose technological investments into solutions that fit the idiosyncratic 
cyber needs of the firm. As such, they facilitate substantive use of security technologies and 
algorithms and reduce subsequent data breaches. Conversely, there is an increasing shortage in the 
supply of cybersecurity talent3 that makes firms successfully recruiting cybersecurity talent distinct in 
accessing a rare and critical complementary resource. So, PECIs accompanied with sufficient 
cybersecurity talent will be deemed more desirable by investors who lend capital (in the form of 
equity or debt) to a firm. Interpreting the desirability of PECIs by considering cybersecurity talent 
sheds light on the extent to which cybersecurity investments create firm-specific value (answering 
Q2), because: a) talent is the agency of innovation and firm-specific solutions (e.g., Schumpeter 
                                                          
2 While Gordon et al. (2010) focus on voluntary disclosures about cybersecurity, our conceptualization is focused only on 
disclosures about cybersecurity investments and does not include other disclosures such as those pertaining to ongoing or 
recent breaches. 
3 For instance, an annual survey of IT professional by the Enterprise Strategy Group (see a summary here: 
https://www.csoonline.com/article/3331983/the-cybersecurity-skills-shortage-is-getting-worse.html) suggests that in 2018-
2019, 53 percent of organizations report a problematic shortage of cybersecurity skills (up from 42 percent in 2015-2016). 
Moreover, a report by Gartner (2018; https://www.gartner.com/en/doc/3566417-adapt-your-traditional-staffing-practices-
for-cybersecurity) suggests that the stagnant cybersecurity budgets and ever-increasing cybersecurity salaries mean that “the 
average security budget will not be enough to close the talent gap that exists.” 
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1934), and b) the shortage in supply of cybersecurity talent, itself, adds to the specificity of PECIs 
when its value critically depends on successful recruitment. 
The second element of increasing the legitimacy of cybersecurity investments, relative value, will 
be determined by institutional norms. Building on previous research on the behavioral theory of the 
firm (BTOF) (Cyert and March 1963) and theories on hacking motivations (Leeson and Coyne 2005; 
Ransbotham and Mitra 2009), we posit that security vulnerabilities of the firm relative to the industry 
average can potentially influence the heterogeneity in the business value gains of cybersecurity 
investments and the talent that supports it. Specifically, we extend the work by Ho et al. (2017), 
which posits that the market value of general IT investments is often interpreted relative to industry 
benchmarks. One key observation that necessitates the consideration of industry benchmarks when 
studying the VCI is that there are increasing reports suggesting in markets plagued with frequent 
security incidents, investors may become numb to subsequent news related to cybersecurity (Gordon 
et al. 2011; Kvochko and Pant 2015; Sen 2018). Therefore, investors’ propensity to reward a firm’s 
PECIs is likely to be influenced by news about other actors in the same market. Interpreting the 
relative value of PECIs by considering the security vulnerability of the firm relative to its industrial 
peers sheds light on the strategic contingencies of value creation by PECIs (answering Q3) as it ties 
the business value to the strategic context in which a firm competes. 
In studying Q1-Q3 empirically, a matched sample of publicly emphasized cybersecurity 
investments is constructed based on public firms’ reports filed with the Security and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) as well as their press releases. The success in recruiting cybersecurity talent is 
assessed based on an extensive proprietary labor dataset that contains information about 70 million 
resumes of workers in the US. The economic impacts of PECIs are tested in industries with different 
levels of security breaches in a sample of 3,130 firm-year matched observations, spanning from 2005 
to 2015. The results reveal a generally positive (negative) impact of PECIs and cybersecurity talent 
recruitment toward the contemporaneous values of Tobin’s 𝑞 (cost of capital), as well as the lagged 
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values of ROA and return on sales ROS. More importantly, we unfold that success in attracting 
cybersecurity talent has a significant impact on the business value accrued from PECIs. These direct 
and indirect (interacting) impacts are stronger for over-performing (un-breached firms in industries 
where breaches are more frequent) and under-performing firms (breached firms in industries where 
breaches are less frequent). We also find that PECIs, together with talent recruitment, are effective in 
reducing subsequent cybersecurity hazards and that the cybersecurity vulnerability of the firm relative 
to its industry peers also impacts the marginal hazard-reduction benefits. 
This study makes several contributions to the literature. First and foremost, this paper extends the 
recent studies highlighting the importance of substantive or actual use of security technology (Angst 
et al. 2017; Kwon and Johnson 2018) and the impact of IT talent (Tambe 2014; Wu et al. 2019), and 
reveals the importance of cybersecurity talent inputs in substantively supporting PECIs. This research 
builds on and extends the work by Angst et al. (2017), who suggest that the institutional 
substantiveness of investments determines the preventive value of organizational cybersecurity 
investments. While Angst et al. (2017) importantly posit that the general characteristic of a firm, 
such as its size, entrepreneurial orientation, and age, impact how a firm is capable of reaping value 
from its cybersecurity investments, we conceptualize the extent of recruitment of cybersecurity talent 
as a cyber-specific characteristic of the firm that determines the professional substantiveness of 
cybersecurity investments. Moreover, we extend the concept of industry benchmark in the general 
business value of IT (BVIT) literature (Ho et al. 2017) and contextualize it into the VCI literature – 
which has generally overlooked the impact of the industry. Specifically, we conceptualize and 
empirically model the security vulnerabilities of the firm relative to the industry peers as a vital 
strategic boundary condition that further explains the value accrued from cybersecurity investments. 
Finally, we extend the literature that has highlighted the business value of cybersecurity investments 
(e.g., Bose and Leung 2019), albeit by only considering forward-looking measures of business value 
(e.g., Tobin’s q, market reactions), and show that: a) the market benefits observed in forward-looking 
indices later extend to the more book-keeping measure of value such as return on assets (ROA) and 
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return on sales (ROS), and b) the reduction in cost of capital may explain the link between the 
observed risk reduction benefits of cybersecurity investments and the subsequent business value 
benefits.  
2.2 Theory development 
2.2.1 The preventive value of cybersecurity investments 
Empirical studies on cybersecurity investments have documented the preventive value of these 
investments by studying their impact on reducing a firm’s cybersecurity risks. A pioneering survey 
study showed that deterrent security administrative procedures and preventive security software 
reduce computer abuse (Straub 1990). Another survey study emphasizing managerial support, 
industry type, and organization size also found deterrent efforts and preventive measures lead to 
enhanced information systems (IS) security effectiveness (Kankanhalli et al. 2003). More recently, an 
archival study using firm announcements revealed that attaching risk-mitigation themes to security 
risk disclosures in annual reports are followed by fewer subsequent breach announcements (Wang et 
al. 2013).  
In contrast to studies focusing on the voluntary practices in pursuing cybersecurity investments, 
the preventive value of these investments is also evaluated in mandatory settings, such as in the 
healthcare industry, wherein governmental agencies regulate and encourage relevant initiatives. 
Particularly, Kwon and Johnson (2013, 2014) showed that cybersecurity investments in mandatory 
settings could have mixed preventive results. They found that in operationally immature hospitals, 
compliance with security regulations significantly reduces data breaches, whereas the effect vanishes 
for operationally mature hospitals (Kwon and Johnson 2013). They also found that proactive security 
investments (not motivated by regulations) in hospitals are associated with lower security failure 
rates, where external regulatory pressure weakens the effect (Kwon and Johnson 2014).  
Finally, moving beyond a nominal view of cybersecurity investments, two recent studies 
addressed the role of investment substantiveness in mitigating threats. Specifically, Angst et al. 
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(2017) showed that only substantive cybersecurity investments in hospitals could effectively reduce 
data breaches. Relatedly, Kwon and Johnson (2018) found that meaningful-use attestation of security 
technology is effective in mitigating certain types of cyber threats in hospitals. 
2.2.2 The business value of cybersecurity investments: a legitimacy view 
The role of cybersecurity investments in risk reduction is far more explained than its role in 
creating business value. This lack of clarity about their business value is in part due to the nature of 
cybersecurity investments. While investing in factors directly involved in production and selling of 
goods and services (e.g., capital, R&D) has a clear path to productivity, organizations are sometimes 
faced with decisions about certain categories of investment, such as investments in cybersecurity, that 
are not direct inputs or throughputs of sales or production. Yet, these investments are important 
because of their risk-reducing impact on matters important to stakeholders (Karnani 2011). Literature 
in strategic management suggests that organizational investments with a  risk-reducing nature, such as 
those related to corporate social responsibilities, can generate positive financial performances through 
the enhancement of firm legitimacy (Cochran and Wood 1984; McWilliams and Siegel 2001). Such 
legitimacy creates value through an important pathway: reduction in the firm’s cost of capital.  
That legitimacy is evaluated by stakeholders is pertinent in explaining this pathway to creating 
business value for the firm. Specifically, stakeholders are key actors in providing capital resources to 
a firm, in the form of equity or debt (Sharfman and Fernando 2008), and therefore, regulate a firm’s 
cost of capital. In regulating these costs, stakeholders consider both current and future risks that they 
deem important in the economic and business well-being of the firm (Sharfman and Fernando 2008) 
and lower the rates charged for accessing capital for firms that have reasonably lower risks. For 
instance, although investments with a significant externality, such as environmental risk management 
investments, appear to have an immediate cost nature to most firms, not committing to them increases 
the risks of litigation by governmental and non-governmental entities and the risks of reputation loss 
(King and Shaver 2001), and subsequently, increases the cost of capital (Sharfman and Fernando 
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2008). Since capital has long been and continues to be an important resource in the production and 
sales processes of a firm (Coma and Douglas 1928; Lemmon and Zender 2019), reducing the costs in 
accessing it renders the firm a critical resource at a lower premium and enhances its gains.   
The legitimacy of organizational initiatives is often gauged by evaluating the extent to which firm 
activities agree with the relevant expectations. In the context of cybersecurity, the widespread 
expectation is that firms should maintain information confidentiality, integrity, and accessibility (Von 
Solms and Van Niekerk 2013). Consequently, investing in cybersecurity tends to agree with this 
expectation, and hence publicly emphasizing it, will increase firm legitimacy. Specifically, PECIs of a 
firm will draw stakeholders’ attention because these activities will determine the firm's information 
security level, which will, in turn, affect the immediate interests of those stakeholders. 
Security breaches reduce trust (Acquisti et al. 2006; Cavusoglu et al. 2004) and erode reputation, 
incur costs of litigation and fines, and may force a firm to engage in strategic shifts to remediate the 
damage. Stakeholders following a firm’s business performance take into consideration these aspects 
when evaluating the riskiness of the firm’s prospect and determining the cost of capital for the firm. 
The evaluation of the cybersecurity damage following security breaches is best exemplified in 
Standard and Poor’s report downgrading the ‘BBB+’ rating outlook of Equifax Inc. to negative, 
following the announcement of its cybersecurity incident in May-July 2017: 
“…we believe the company faces meaningful costs related to lawsuits and 
potential government investigations… Further, we project that Equifax will see 
some pressure on its operations over the next 12 to 18 months. In particular, the 
company's Global Consumer Solutions business (13% of 2016 revenue) could see 
steep revenue declines since it derives a large portion of revenues from the U.S. 
consumer credit protection service. Finally, the incident also poses reputational 
risk that would have an impact on its other lines of business albeit to a lesser 
extent…” 
To counter the current or future adverse impacts, cybersecurity investments can restore or 
increase trust in the firm and enhance its legitimacy. However, due to the externality of the agency 
evaluating these investments (i.e., stakeholders), broadcasting these initiatives is critical. A public 
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firm formally broadcasts its cybersecurity investments via the official reports filed with the SEC. 
While some may question the sincerity of such reports, it is worth noting that these documents have 
legal consequences, where shareholders have the right to sue a public company if there is a significant 
discrepancy between their promises and actions (Rogers et al. 2011). Hence, stakeholders have good 
reasons to react correspondingly to PECIs, thereby increasing the legitimacy and valuation of the firm 
(Zajac and Westphal 2004), which in turn will be met with economic rewards.  Therefore, under the 
tenets of the legitimacy view, and consistent with prior literature (Bose and Leung 2019; Chai et al. 
2011; Gordon et al. 2010)4, we posit the following as our baseline hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 1: Public emphasis on cybersecurity investments creates positive 
business values for the investing firm.  
2.2.3 Substantiveness and the desirability of cybersecurity investments 
The tenets of organizational legitimacy theory (Suchman 1995) assert that organizational actions 
create legitimacy only if they are deemed desirable. The existing literature on the preventive value of 
cybersecurity investments (e.g., Angst et al. 2017) has already unfolded the critical importance of 
substantive cyber investments in reducing data breaches. As such, stakeholders would assess 
substantively supported PECIs more desirably than ones that are not, since those unsupported actions 
do not reduce the risks that matter to stakeholders.  
As with any organizational investment, the success of cybersecurity investments relies on various 
organizational support, among which the provision of technical labor is perhaps the most 
fundamental. Specifically, acquiring human talent with expertise in cybersecurity allows leveraging 
generic technological assets and solutions, e.g., intrusion detection systems and anomaly detection 
algorithms, and turning them into idiosyncratic solutions. The knowledge-based view of the firm 
                                                          
4 We acknowledge that this hypothesis has similarities with the existing literature (i.e., Bose and Leung 2013, 2019; Chai et 
al. 2011); however, our empirical examination of this hypothesis differs in two distinct ways: a) our examination considers a 
broader range of investments, not only limited to a specific technological investment such as intrusion detection (departing 
from Bose and Leung 2013, 2019), and b) our assessment of business value extends beyond forward-looking or short-term 
indices of value and also includes important book-keeping indices such as cost of capital, ROA, and ROS (departing from 
Bose and Leung 2013, 2019; Chai et al. 2011). 
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positions human talent in a key role (Felin and Hesterly 2007) to integrate the knowledge about the 
organization, its legacy systems, and unique cybersecurity threats with the knowledge about general-
purpose assets, such as cybersecurity solutions. Since technical know-how is embedded in IT labor, 
which will shape the return on IT investments (Tambe 2014; Tambe and Hitt 2013), security talent 
will heavily influence the outcomes of cybersecurity investments. The essential role of IT labor in IT 
productivity has been documented in BVIT literature. On top of its direct contribution to productivity 
(Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996; Tambe and Hitt 2012), IT workforce complements other IT investments 
(Melville et al. 2004; Tambe 2014; Wu et al. 2019).  
As the landscape of a firm’s information and enterprise systems evolves in response to its 
idiosyncratic needs, existing cybersecurity measures will require reviewing, updating, and swift 
adaptations.  Moreover, cybersecurity threats to a firm are not only shaped by idiosyncrasies that arise 
from the uniqueness of internal legacy systems and specificity of a firm’s vulnerabilities. Rather, the 
cyber risks of a firm are also intertwined with its broader institutional context. Negative externalities, 
dynamics of its peer institutions’ cybersecurity strategies, and their extended history of previous 
attacks and imminent threats (Haislip et al. 2019; Jeong and Lee 2019; Sen and Borle 2015) all can 
interactively impact the cybersecurity risks and required responses in the firm, adding to its 
cybersecurity specificity and idiosyncrasy. Therefore, such a degree of idiosyncratic risks, as 
perceived by stakeholders, emboldens the importance of human talent in inventing ways to utilize a 
set of general-purpose solutions and apply them to firm-specific threats. 
Without a commitment to investment in cybersecurity talent, a firm can barely paint itself as an 
institution well-equipped to counter or remediate cyber threats. Considering the increasing utilization 
of online job search platforms for recruitment purposes and the popularity of professional social 
media platforms such as LinkedIn, investors are increasingly aware of a firm’s talent recruitment 
efforts. Hence, when a firm hires cybersecurity personnel, it signals its intention to substantively 
implement and assimilate its PECIs rather than merely symbolically broadcasting them. Possessing 
skilled personnel is essential in effectively using those investments, and hiring involves significant 
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contractual and other long-term commitments by the firm. Thus, stakeholders view cybersecurity 
talent as a substantive complement to PECIs to reduce cyber risks. This will increase the firm’s 
legitimacy and ultimately boost firm value: 
Hypothesis 2: Cybersecurity talent recruitment enhances the positive association 
between publicly emphasizing cybersecurity investments and business value.  
2.2.4 The relative value of cybersecurity investments 
The legitimacy of a firm’s actions are often interpreted contingently in a socially-relative fashion 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Kostova and Zaheer 1999). That is, the legitimacy of organizational 
actions are evaluated by considering how those actions impact the firm relative to its industry peers 
(Doh et al. 2010). The behavioral theory of the firm (BTOF) (Cyert and March 1963) suggests that 
rational decision-makers, learning from repeated economic and market transactions and feedback 
loops, often engage in actions that either help a firm under-performing its aspirations reach its desired 
objectives (i.e., problemistic search) (Argote and Greve 2007; Miller and Chen 1994), or allow a firm 
over-performing its aspirations to keep its superior position (i.e., slack search) (Greve 2003b; Nohria 
and Gulati 1996). Notably, under- and over-performing relative to goals defined in the institutional 
context (i.e., social aspirational gaps) are identified as drivers of key organizational actions. 
Numerous studies have reported empirical support for both problemistic and slack searches as the 
basis for rational organizational actions such as increasing R&D budgets (Greve 2003a), finding new 
strategic partners (Baum et al. 2005), and acquiring another firm (Iyer and Miller 2008). Since these 
rational actions are learned from and reinforced by the feedback received from the markets and 
stakeholders (Cyert and March 1963; Levitt and March 1988), it is plausible to assume that actions 
pertaining to either problemistic or slack search are deemed more legitimate relative to those that do 
not fall into either category.   
Therefore, the pursuit of PECIs by firms under- or over-performing relative to the cybersecurity 
of peer firms may be deemed more legitimate by stakeholders. Additionally, exercising PECIs when a 
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firm is on par with its rivals may be viewed as less necessary, and therefore, met with fewer 
legitimacy rents. In an industry where security breaches are highly frequent, an un-breached firm is 
considered over-performing relative to its institutional environment, whereas a breached firm is 
considered performing as expected (on-par firm). In an industry where security breaches are less 
frequent, a breached firm is under-performing, whereas an un-breached firm is performing as 
expected (also, on-par firm).  
The broad social relativity expectations extrapolated from BTOF also align with reasons specific 
to the cybersecurity context. That is, over- and under-performing firms potentially face greater 
cybersecurity risks relative to the firms performing on par with their industry. Therefore, the marginal 
value of PECIs and substantive talent recruitments supporting them are higher, due to the bigger risk 
they mitigate. The reasons for higher risks faced by under- and over-performing firms relative to on-
par firms, as perceived by stakeholders, are rooted in the motivations and enablers that instigate 
security breaches. 
Existing research on motivations of outsiders with malicious intent orchestrating security 
breaches (hereafter, hackers) shows that they are either driven by profit or fame (Leeson and Coyne 
2005). Profit-driven hackers determine their targets based on cost-benefit analyses (Cremonini and 
Nizovtsev 2009); fame-driven hackers determine the targets based on the degree of fame and joy of 
successful hacks. Hackers have been shifting their focus toward financial gains, and profit-driven 
hackers tend to inflict more damages than fame-driven ones (Sieberg 2005). Moreover, the existing 
research suggests that knowledge about organizational cyber vulnerabilities are often disseminated in 
dark forums and networks such as Darknet and Deepnet sites (e.g., Jordan and Taylor 1998; Benjamin 
et al. 2016). These vulnerabilities often go on dark market sales5. Like any other product, the value of 
these exploitations is determined by the characteristics of the target and the value that the exploitation 
                                                          
5 For example, FireEye, a major cybersecurity firm, identified an exploit for a Windows vulnerability (MS15-010/CVE 
2015-0057) being sold on a darknet market for 48 BTC (around$10,000-15,000; April 2015), eventually tracing this 
vulnerability being exploited by Dyre Banking Trojan to steal credit card information in July 2015. 
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can yield. For an under-performing firm (i.e., breached in industries with a low frequency of 
breaches), two factors make their cybersecurity exploitation a low-cost mission to hackers, and 
therefore, increase their attractiveness to hackers. First, the relative unimpactedness of other firms in 
the industry signals that focusing on the already breached firm may require less effort to find fresh 
exploitations. Second, the already disseminated information about the exploited vulnerability can be 
leveraged again at a lower premium than its initial sales value. Therefore, an under-performing firm 
becomes a low-cost target and will be at a heightened risk relative to its peers, in the same industry, 
that are unexploited. This increased risk of re-exploitation is recognized by stakeholders and raises 
their sensitivity to PECIs by under-performers, leading to higher marginal value from PECIs gained 
by under-performers. 
Albeit for different reasons, over-performing firms (unbreached in industries with a high 
frequency of breaches) are also more attractive targets relative to their peers. In an industry with 
frequent breaches, an over-performing firm is a target with a higher yield than a firm performing as 
expected (breached) because the breached information from on-par firms (i.e., its customers' 
credit/personal information) is likely already available in the black market, hence less valuable. More 
importantly, frequent breaches in the environment suggest low attacking cost or high attacking yield, 
or both. In either case, profit-minded hackers will be more willing to tap into unbreached firms when 
there are more breaches in the environment: the knowledge externalities of similar attacks to breached 
peers reduce the costs of attacking the unbreached firm, and the unbreached status of the firm 
increases the yield of a potential exploit (since, for instance, exploited information about customers of 
an unbreached firm is not readily traded in black markets, and hence, is of more value to buyers). For 
fame-driven hackers, over-performing firms may be particularly enticing targets since the utility (e.g., 
fame, sense of achievement) gained from breaking into an un-breached firm is much higher than 
exploiting previously breached firms. Attracting both profit- and fame-driven hackers, over-
performers are expected to move first and signal their superior protection through cybersecurity 
investments to deter attacks (Cavusoglu et al. 2008; Cremonini and Nizovtsev 2009). Stakeholders 
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recognizing the higher future risks to over-performers, relative to their already-breached peers, will 
then reward PECIs by over-performers at a higher rate. Put together, we posit the following: 
Hypothesis 3: The increase in business value as a result of emphasizing 
cybersecurity investments is greater for under-performing and over-performing 
firms relative to their peers.  
In discussing the complementary role of human talent in increasing value creation with PECIs, 
we explained that supporting talent is deemed essential by stakeholders to leverage general 
investments and turn them into idiosyncratic solutions. Therefore, the perceived value and necessity 
of human talent in leveraging PECIs increases as does the firm’s need for idiosyncratic cybersecurity 
solutions. Both under- and over-performing firms show more unique risk patterns relative to their 
peers in the same industries. Therefore, under- and over-performing firms are perceived more 
idiosyncratic in their cybersecurity needs, as they get evaluated by stakeholders.  
An under-performing firm requires solutions that uncover why, in a low-risk environment, the 
firm has emerged as a target to ensure such anomalies do not happen again. Moreover, relative to 
their unbreached peers, under-performing firms have to engage in additional screening that ensures 
the dissemination of their unfolded vulnerabilities is contained, to avoid secondary exploitations.  
Therefore, stakeholders do not view common solutions followed by safe peers as sufficient responses 
by under-performers.  
For over-performing firms, their strong position relative to other peers alludes to the presence of 
idiosyncrasies that make hackers’ disseminated knowledge about vulnerabilities of other firms less 
applicable to them. But such a privileged position may not be sustainable as hackers continuously 
build on their gained knowledge from the vulnerabilities of the breached peers of over-performers. 
Therefore, stakeholders expect over-performing firms to continue to bring in human talent that can 
keep up with changes to the information systems portfolio of the firm and maintain its security 
idiosyncrasies relative to its institutional peers. Further, as over-performers stand out as cyber-
security leaders among struggling peers, they must deal with a higher frequency of fame-driven 
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exploitation efforts. Therefore, they have to develop cybersecurity capabilities that are different from 
those possessed by peers under less strain for fame-driven attacks. Also, their exposure to both types 
of profit- and fame-driven exploitations makes their portfolio of risks dissimilar to their peers. Put 
together, the idiosyncratic cybersecurity needs of under- and over-performing firms relative to their 
peers make the support of human talent an even more critical complementary input in the eyes of 
stakeholders. Stakeholders recognizing these idiosyncrasies would, therefore, reward the 
complementarities between PECIs and recruiting cybersecurity talent at a higher rate.  Thus: 
Hypothesis 4: The increase in business value as a result of the interaction 
between emphasizing cybersecurity investments and recruiting cybersecurity 
talent is greater for under-performing and over-performing firms relative to their 
peers. 
2.3 Method 
2.3.1 Data and sample 
In creating our initial sample (Sample I), we followed the guidelines by Gorodon et al. (2010) and 
obtained SEC disclosures of public firms, from 2005 to 2015. A firm was kept in the sample only if: 
all of the firm’s financial information was available, if its book value was positive, and if the firm’s 
industry classification was not missing. This resulted in 99,904 firm-year observations belonging to 
6,244 pubic firms. Then, a dataset on publicly announced security breaches and emphasized 
cybersecurity investments is constructed by conducting a keyword search among news sources from 
2005 to 2015 on Lexis-Nexis. Sample search terms include cybersecurity, security, phishing, etc. (See 
Appendix A for a complete list of keywords). Two research assistants compiled the news releases to: 
a) eliminate duplicate announcements, b) eliminate irrelevant announcements, and c) categorize the 
announcements into two broad groups of breaches or cybersecurity investments. The three tasks’ 
convergence rates for the two research assistants are 98%, 91%, and 87%, respectively. In a 
subsequent round, the disagreements were resolved by revisiting the initial schemes and definitions 
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relevant to the study. This process yielded 2,884 announcements about cybersecurity investments 
made by 1,673 firms (Sample 𝐴0) and 4,871 announcements about security breaches by 3,978 firms 
(Sample 𝐵0). Data breach incidents are also supplemented by records from the Privacy Rights 
Clearinghouse website (www.privacyrights.org).  
Therefore, only a limited number of firms in our sample (i.e., 26 percent) experienced at least one 
publicly announced cybersecurity investment in the span of 16 years covered in the study. It is then 
conceivable to assume that some unobserved factors influence the selection of a firm into our target 
treatment (i.e., publicly announced cybersecurity investments). As such, the comparison between the 
self-selected treatment firms and those that did not self-select may lead to biased estimates because of 
the conflation of the treatment with the unobserved self-selection factors6. Hence, although we start 
our empirical presentation of our findings by focusing on Sample I, we further pruned Sample I to 
construct a matched sample that attenuates such biased comparisons. 
Since examining H3 and H4 requires creating subsamples based on the relative vulnerability of 
the firm, we start building our matched sample by estimating the extent of the occurrence of security 
breaches in the industry in which each observation in Sample 𝐴0 (i.e., firms with at least one year of 
treatment) is active. Therefore, the initial set of announcements about security breaches (Sample 𝐵0) 
is reduced to publicly-traded firms and then matched to at least one represented industry in Sample 
A0, based on two-digit SIC codes. The reduced sample contains 2,717 firm-year security breach 
announcements made by 2,308 firms (Sample B). Based on data from Sample B, we divide the 
Sample 𝐴0  industries (based on two-digit SIC codes) into ones with a high and low frequency of 
breach (based on a median split of the frequency of breaches happening in each industry in a given 
year, utilizing information from Sample B), and categorize each firm-year observation in 𝐴0 into one 
of the following subsample categories: SS1) breached in a low-frequency industry (under-
performing), SS2) breached in a high-frequency industry (performing on par in high risk), SS3) not 
                                                          
6 Put differently, an unrestricted sample’s estimates are potentially biased as the extent of PECIs does not reasonably 
exogeneousely vary, and the choice of PECIs is restricted for some firms, but not for the others. 
21 
 
breached in a low-frequency industry (performing on par in low risk), and SS4) not breached in a 
high-frequency industry (over-performing). The main estimations of the study are run separately in 
each subsample. Table 2.1 summarizes the description of each subsample.  
Table 2.1 Subsample Classifications 
  Low breach frequency in industry High breach frequency in industry 
Breached (SS1) Under-performing firms  (SS2) On-par firms (high-risk industry) 
Un-breached (SS3) On-par firms (low-risk industry) (SS4) Over-performing firms 
To balance the sample of treated firm-year observations (Sample 𝐴0) with proper counterfactuals, 
we look for untreated observations from the same firm in an adjacent year (t+1 or t-1) that satisfy two 
conditions: a) the firm does not publicly announce a cybersecurity investment in that adjacent year, 
and b) the firm’s categorization into the four mentioned subsamples remains unchanged across the 
treated and control (adjacent) years. This matching procedure ensures that our comparison between 
the treated and untreated observations is less biased since the sample of counterfactuals is also 
selected from the firms that, in close chronological proximity (i.e., a year), can undergo, or have 
undergone, the treatment.  This matching procedure also allows us to remove the firm-specific time-
invariant heterogeneities. After this matching process, 3,130 firm-year observations (1565 pairs of 
treatment and counterfactuals) belonging to 582 unique firms (Sample A) are retained for the 
analysis.  For each firm-year observation in Sample A, cybersecurity talent recruitment data are 
obtained from a proprietary dataset of over 70 million online resumes that are posted from 2008 to 
2017 and supplemented by a major online employment-related search engine.  
2.3.2 Measures 
Following previous business value of IT literature (Bharadwaj et al. 1999; Chari et al. 2008), the 
business value of cybersecurity investment is primarily measured by considering Tobin’s 𝑞 ratio7. As 
a forward-looking measure of firm value, Tobin’s 𝑞 is less sensitive to accounting practices and is 
appropriate for the evaluation of IT-related investments (Chari et al. 2008). In the security context, 
Angst et al. (2017) pointed out that the benefits of substantive adoption will take time to be realized, 
                                                          
7 Later, we examine the impacts of the forward lags of ROA and ROS. 
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making Tobin’s 𝑞 the proper contemporaneous measure of value. When Tobin’s 𝑞 is higher than 1, 
the long-run equilibrium market value is greater than the book value of the firm, signifying an 
unmeasured source of profit (Bharadwaj et al. 1999). Following Chung and Pruitt (1994), Tobin’s 𝒒 
is calculated as 𝑞 = (Market value of common stock + liquidating value of preferred stock + 
liabilities)/Total assets.  
A firm’s PECIs in year 𝑡 is measured by considering the emphasis on the investments in SEC 
filings8. Various Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) reports (10-K, 10-Q, 8-K, 8-K/A) for 
the 3,130 observations from sample A were collected from SEC’s EDGAR database9. Paragraphs 
containing the keywords pertaining to cybersecurity investments were highlighted automatically, by a 
search engine, and manually confirmed by two research assistants. Adapting the measure of IT 
emphasis in SEC reports from Steelman et al.’s (2019) work, PECIs is calculated as the natural log of 
the ratio of paragraphs about cybersecurity investments to the total number of paragraphs in that 
year’s SEC filings10. Although SEC documents filed by a firm are a critical source to relay key 
information about cybersecurity investments of a firm, other press releases likely provide more depth 
and information to stakeholders.  As such, in a subsequent analysis, we also estimate our model with 
a measure of public release emphasis, which is a ratio of the number of cybersecurity-related public 
press releases by a firm in year 𝑡 to the number of all of its public press releases in the same year. 
The information about the cybersecurity talent recruitment (TR) is extracted from the employees’ 
posted resumes (i.e., from the database of 70 million resumes). Particularly, to estimate the number of 
cybersecurity talent recruited by firm i in year t, we first searched the job positions sections of the 
resumes in our sample and count instances where an individual with cybersecurity expertise had 
                                                          
8 This approach is similar to Gordon et al.’s (2010) approach, although unlike their 0/1 measurement, we use a continuous 
measure of emphasizing cybersecurity investments. 
9 The results of the study remain qualitatively unchanged when only 10-K reports are considered, as well as when the 
number of distinct investments is controlled for. These findings are discussed under the “Robustness tests” section.   
10 While most announcements and emphasis on them in annual reports mention investment in cybersecurity technologies 
(e.g., investment in encryption technologies) and investment in cybersecurity innovation (e.g., budget assignment to develop 
an in-house security labs, and investment in cybersecurity startups), we dropped 32 announcements and 78 annual report 
mentions that were directly linked to talent-related activities to avoid double-counting. Under the “Robustness tests” section, 
we present results of an estimation that explicitly includes the number of distinct technological (TECH) and innovational 
(INN) investments as covariates. 
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indicated starting a position in year t at firm i11.  For instance, to identify cybersecurity talent 
recruited by Target Inc. in 2013, we searched our database for posted resumes of individuals where 
they had indicated starting a position at Target Inc. in 2013 and also had cybersecurity-related 
keywords mentioned in their roles and projects performed. This approach is similar to labor measures 
introduced and developed by Tambe and Hitt (2012). 
Specifically, to identify a cybersecurity employee recruited by a firm in year t, we started with 
identifying sections of resumes that report an individual’s previous positions or projects. Because 
different individuals design their resumes differently, a selected set of HTML versions of the online 
resumes (1000 resumes) were first manually mined to identify the header keywords that different 
individuals use to list their previous and current job positions. From this initial mining, a bag of 
header keywords was formed to identify the parts of a resume that detail job positions. Then, these 
identified sections of all the available resumes were searched to find matches with the set of firms in 
our sample to: a) determine if firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡 recruited a particular individual, and b) identify the 
cybersecurity expertise of that individual (and his/her extent of expertise based on the number of 
years of experience in a cybersecurity project/position).  
To evaluate the cybersecurity expertise in each retained resume, we start by using a list of skillset 
keywords as indicated in Table A1 in the Appendix A. To categorize a recruited employee into the 
security-related IT labor group at year 𝑡, the employee’s resume should report at least one job 
position or executed project, in periods before year 𝑡, where the title or the summary of the 
position/project (if any) contains the keywords related to cybersecurity. Since it is possible that our 
initial list missed other relevant keywords, such as more complicated bi- or tri-grams pertaining to 
security-related skills, we manually coded another set of 1000 resumes and categorized the 
individuals to those with cybersecurity skills and those without it. Then, this scored set was used as 
                                                          
11 Since the names of employees posting their resumes are redacted in our database (to preserve idnividuals’ identity and 
privacy, per the online platform’s request), we took an additional step to ensure we do not double count employees that may 
have posted their resumes at two or more points of time. We ran a search to find exact matches of resumes based on 
previous employers and the educational history and removed those exact matches.  
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an input to a machine learning algorithm, by following Bai et al. (2004; see section 4.3 of this work 
for a sketch of the algorithm), to further identify the more complex, relevant keywords (including the 
more complex bi- and tri-grams). Once the machine-learning algorithm scored the retained resumes, 
another random sample of 1000 resumes was selected and manually coded. While we did not find any 
resumes that were misclassified as a skilled cybersecurity individual by the algorithm, we find 26 
instances where an individual with cybersecurity talent was misclassified as non-cyber talent 
(misclassification rate: 2.6%). Given the lack of false positives and a misclassification rate below 5%, 
we proceeded with the classifications obtained from our machine-learning algorithm at this stage.  
The extent of cybersecurity talent recruitment (TR) is measured by the natural log of the sum of 
recruited security-related IT employees, weighted by the number of years that each individual has 
been in projects/positions related to cybersecurity before recruitment, in a firm for a given year12. 
Following Tambe and Hitt (2012), we consider the talent movements unfolded by mining the resumes 
present in our database as a sample of the actual talent recruited by each firm. Since different firms 
can have a different rate of resume representation in our sample, we scale the raw values of TR by a 
firm-specific sampling rate, ρ, which is estimated as the number of all workers in all occupations in 
our data from a particular firm in a particular year divided by the number of all workers in all 
occupation for the same firm-year observation as reported in COMPUSTAT13. 
Since our dataset includes resumes of employees that actively look to change jobs, it is possible 
that our measure of TR is biased, as those employees may oversell their cybersecurity skills due to the 
demand for it. We have three reasons to believe that such a measurement error does not 
systematically bias the TR measurement. First, we aggregated our measure of TR by industry and 
                                                          
12 Models that consider the pool of talent (existing + recruited) also show results that are qualitatively converging with the 
results based on this main measure. However, the models specified with TR show better fit indices, perhaps due further 
observability of the recruited talent, compared to the talent pool, in online job posting platforms where a firm’s hiring 
activities become visible to investors.  
13 The results remain qualitatively similar when the weight of cybersecurity talent is based on the inverse of the Mahalanobis 
distance between the vector of cybersecurity keywords listed on the individual’s resume and the cybersecurity keywords 
mentioned in the SEC filing of the firm in the year of recruitment. Due to the similarity of these estimates to our main 
estimates, we have not included them in the manuscript, but these results are available upon request. 
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compared the share of each industry in recruiting TR with the share of each industry in hiring 
"information security analyst" as reported by Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) and found a 
Spearman’s rank correlation of 0.961. This high correlation suggests that the distribution of 
cybersecurity talent across industries in our sample is very close to the distribution of cybersecurity 
recruitment in BLS surveys. Although this is not direct evidence of cross-firm unbiasedness, it 
suggests a lack of bias in reporting TR across industries in our sample. 
Further, we randomly selected profiles of 1000 IT employees on LinkedIn, working in at least 
one of the firm-year observations of our sample, and compared the extent of TR for those firm-year 
observations estimated based on the LinkedIn information with the extent of TR based on 1000 
randomly-selected resumes form our proprietary dataset in the same fashion and observed a 
correlation of 0.767 between the two measures. Since LinkedIn is a professional networking platform, 
rather than an exclusive online job search engine, the high correlation between the measure of TR in 
our dataset and the one constructed from LinkedIn may indicate that individuals who actively seek to 
change jobs (and hence using an online job search engine) do not excessively oversell their skills. Our 
concerns are further attenuated because our measure of TR relies on traceable positions and projects 
that an individual reports, rather than merely relying on the skillset keywords listed in the resumes.  
Finally, for each firm-year observation, we estimated the number of IT employees in our sample 
of resumes and compared this figure with the number of IT employees reported by the same firm-year 
in the Computer Intelligence (CI) database. We observed a Spearman’s rank correlation of 0.914 
between the two measures. Since IT skills, in general, are also considered to have an above-average 
demand, the high correlation between our measure of IT employment and the one obtained from the 
CI database suggests the overselling bias may not be distributed systematically across firm-year 
observations in our sample. 
Apart from the year fixed effects, we also control for few other firm variables. Related 
diversification is evaluated by the entropy measure (Robins and Wiersema 1995) used in prior 
literature (Bharadwaj et al. 1999). We measure firm size as the natural log of the number of 
26 
 
employees in thousands. Total assets is measured using reported data from COMPUSTAT. R&D and 
advertising (ADV) expenditures are estimated using the ratio of the investment amounts divided by 
the firm’s annual revenue, accessed from COMPUSTAT. Table 2.2 presents the correlation matrix, 
and Table 2.3 presents a summary of variables and their measurement. 
 
Table 2.2 Correlation table 
  Variable Mean Std. Dev. 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Tobin’s q 1.11 1.31               
2 PECIs -5.60 -4.12 0.09       
3 TR 5.06 5.64 0.14 0.13      
4 Related diversification 0.17 0.32 0.03 0.03 -0.07     
5 Firm size 3.03 1.12 0.04 0.12 0.14 0.02    
6 Assets 0.48 0.18 0.22 0.11 0.18 0.01 0.22   
7 R&D 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.10 0.12 0.03 0.21 0.04  








Table 2.3 Variables and measurement 
  Variable Measure Data Source 
Dependent 
variables 
Tobin's q (Market value of equity + book value of inventories + liquidating value of 
preferred stock + long-term debt + net short-term debt) / total assets 
COPMUSTAT, CRSP 
Return on Assets (ROA) Net income / total assets COPMUSTAT 
Return on Sales (ROS) Operating income / net sales COPMUSTAT 
Security Hazard Estimated based on a cox proportional hazard model that uses the time of a 




Cost of Capital Weighted average cost of capital (see Appendix C) COPMUSTAT, 
Bloomberg financial 
Cost of goods sold All expenses directly allocated by the company to production, such as 
material, labor, and overhead. 
COPMUSTAT 






ln(number of paragraphs about cybersecurity investments / total number of 
paragraphs in SEC filings) (adapted from Steelman et al.’s (2019) measure of 
organizational commitment to IT) 
EDGAR 
Talent Recruitment (TR) ln(total number of employees recruited with cybersecurity talent, weighted by 
each employee’s number of years of experience in cybersecurity roles/projects 
before recruitment) (the raw natural log measure is scaled by the firm-specific 
sampling rate, ρ, following Tambe and Hitt (2012)) 
Proprietary online 
resume dataset 
Press Release Emphasis 
(PRE), for robustness  
Number of cybersecurity-related public press release/total number of public 
press releases 
LexisNexis 
    
Control 
variables 
Firm Size ln(number of employees in thousands) COPMUSTAT 
Assets Total assets COPMUSTAT 
Diversification Entropy measure as outlined in Robins and Wiersema (1995) COPMUSTAT 
R&D R&D expenditure / annual revenue COPMUSTAT 




2.3.3 Estimation  
For each of the subsamples in Table 1, we start with estimating the following equation: 
𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑃𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ⋅ 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ⋅ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 ⋅ 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 
        +𝛽6 ⋅ 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 ⋅ 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 +  𝑐𝑖                                                                               (1)   
where subscripts 𝑖 and 𝑡 denote firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡.  𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the error term, and 𝑐𝑖 is the firm-specific 
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity term. Further, in line with our theoretical discussion, we 
assume that 𝛽1is influenced by TR. Therefore, we re-write (1) as the following: 
𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑃𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 + Ɣ1 ⋅ 𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ⋅ 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ⋅ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 
     +𝛽5 ⋅ 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 ⋅ 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 ⋅ 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡  + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡 +  𝑐𝑖                                                   (2) 
To estimate Equations (1) and (2), we treat PECIs, TR, and their interaction endogenous, since 
some unobserved time-variant factors may influence the set of these variables as well as the error 
term. Therefore, these variables are instrumented when estimating both equations using a panel two-
stage least squares (2SLS) procedure.  
To identify the set of appropriate instruments (𝑋𝑖𝑡), we start with factors identified by Xue et al. 
(2012), which instrument generic investments in IT. Mainly, they use the firm's previous year IT 
investment (ex_IT), the industry IT investment (ind_IT) (from the Current-Cost Investment in Private 
residential Fixed Assets Table from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)), the industry tax ratio 
(Tax) (GDP-by-industry tables reported by BEA), the industry-operating surplus (Surplus) (from 
BEA's GDP-by-industry tables), the industry material-energy input ratio (MER) (calculated using 
BEA's value-added-by-industry tables), the industry service-energy input ratio (SER) (calculated 
using BEA's added-by-industry tables), and the industry import-export value (IEX) (from BEA's 
industry input-output use tables) as related instruments (Xue et al. 2012). The industry variables are 
weighted by a firm's sales in that industry. To estimate the firm’s previous year’s IT investment, we 
utilize the CI database. While these sets of instruments are most relevant to generic IT investments, 
we included the Hausman-type industry- averages of PECIs, TR, and their interaction as additional 
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instruments to improve the relevance of the set of instruments, following the existing literature (Aral 
et al. 2017; Cachon et al. 2018; Lu et al. 2017; Mithas and Rust 2016). 
Moreover, to bolster the exogeneity conditions of our instruments, we focus on two exogenous 
shocks that can impact both a firm’s PECIs and TR.  First, and focusing on the legislative 
environment, we expect that the passage of legislation that requires investment in cybersecurity can 
be a suitable exogenous shock influencing both PECIs and TR. In looking for such legislation, we 
searched for those that show enough variation for the firms in our sample in the period of 2005 to 
2015. Specifically, state laws passed to require firms to provide security breach notifications to 
stakeholders in case of cybersecurity breaches show relevance and variability in our sample. Between 
2005 and 2015, all but three states (New Mexico, South Dakota, and Alabama), passed a version of 
security breach notification laws (SBNL), while California had passed its SBNL in 2002. Therefore, 
we used the passage of SBNLit as an additional instrument (SBNLit= 1, if a version of SBNL law is 
passed14 in the state where the headquarters of firm i is located, in year t or prior; SBNLit= 0, 
otherwise). 
  Second, and focusing on local markets supplying cybersecurity knowledge and talent to a firm, 
we expect that the introduction of cybersecurity degrees in higher education institutions in 
metropolitan areas where a firm has customer-facing operations (or headquarters) can increase the 
access to cybersecurity talent and influence investment in cybersecurity. We mined our dataset of 
online resumes to identify emerging educational degrees related to cybersecurity (e.g., an 
undergraduate minor in information assurance, a master’s degree in cybersecurity and risk 
management) in different metropolitan areas in the US. In sum, we identified 146 cybersecurity-
related degrees, which began showing up in individuals’ resumes from 2005 to 2015. We used the 
earliest graduation year for an emerging degree in the 2005-2015 window as the date from which the 
cybersecurity workforce educated with that degree enters the job market. Therefore, the second 
                                                          
14 We use the date that law is signed for our analysis, as it is the point of time in which firms absorb the legislative news and 
start reacting. However, models that consider the effective date for the law for measuring SBNL variable produce 
qualitatively similar results. These results are available by authors upon request. 
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exogenous shock used as an instrument is the emergence of a cybersecurity degree (CyberDegit) in 
one of the metropolitan areas of operation to the firm (CyberDegit= 1, if a cybersecurity degree is 
started in at least one metropolitan area where firm 𝑖 has some operations (in the form a customer-
facing business unit or headquarters) in year t or prior; CyberDegit= 0, otherwise).  
The set of these instruments show strong statistical relevance to the endogenous variables as 
shown in stage 1 estimations presented in Appendix B. Specifically, the Cragg-Donald Wald F 
Statistic exceeds 5% maximal bias of the IV estimator relative to OLS in all four subsamples and in 
both equations (Stock and Yogo 2005), rejecting the null hypothesis of the equations being weakly 
identified (For Equation (1): SS1’s F-statistic = 3282.16, SS2’s F-statistic = 2443.89, SS3’s F-statistic 
= 3517.74, SS4’s F-statistic = 2438.46, Stock and Yogo’s critical value for 2 endogenous variables 
and 12 instruments= 19.40; For Equation (2): SS1’s F-statistic = 2812.12, SS2’s F-statistic = 3008.93, 
SS3’s F-statistic = 3192.32, SS4’s F-statistic = 2457.22, Stock and Yogo’s critical value for 3 
endogenous variables and 12 instruments= 17.80). Moreover, the Sargan’s test of over-identification 
fails to reject the null hypothesis that the set of instruments used in Equations (1) and (2) are 
exogenous to error terms (For Equation (1): p = 0.417 for SS1, p = 0.338  for SS2, p = 0.572 for SS3, 
p = 0.403 for SS4; For Equation (2): p = 0.392 for SS1, p = 0.217 for SS2, p = 0.187  for SS3, p = 
0.282  for SS4).   
2.4 Results 
We start by a set of preliminary analyses to ensure the validity of our estimation and sampling 
approach. These analyses are then followed by a set of analyses that provide evidence pertaining to 
the business value of PECIs. Then, these main analyses are supplemented by a set of tests that shed 
light on the possible mechanisms through which business value is created by PECIs.  
2.4.1 Preliminary results 
We preface our analysis by providing estimations of equation 2 for the full unrestricted (I) and the 
matched samples (A), both using a regular fixed-effects estimation and a panel 2SLS regression. We 
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conduct this preliminary analysis to present the potential upward bias that may occur if an 
unrestricted sample is used to conduct our main analyses. Table 2.4 presents the result of these 
preliminary estimations. Columns 1 and 2 in Table 2.4 provide estimates from the unrestricted sample 
(I), and columns 3 and 4 provide the results of the estimation in the matched sample (A). The 
coefficients of 𝑃𝐸𝐶𝐼, 𝑇𝑅, and 𝑇𝑅 × 𝑃𝐸𝐶𝐼 are significant and positive across the four estimations. 
However, the effect sizes are considerably larger in the unrestricted samples as compared to the 
matched sample estimates. The inflated estimates in the unrestricted sample may indicate an upward 
bias when treated observations are compared to a set of uncontrolled counterfactuals. Therefore, to 
increase the validity of our hypothesis testing, we present our main analyses in the four subsamples 
based on estimates in the matched sample (A), which provides more conservative estimates. 
Table 2.4 Preliminary Results 
 
FE 
Unrestricted sample (I) 
2SLS 
Unrestricted sample (I) 
FE 
Matched sample (A) 
2SLS 
Matched sample (A) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PECIs (H1) 0.092*** (0.008) 0.064* (0.030) 0.043*** (0.007) 0.033* (0.017) 
TR 0.114*** (0.003) 0.081* (0.04) 0.058* (0.028) 0.051* (0.024) 
TR×PECIs (H2) 0.103*** (0.007) 0.059* (0.027) 0.041** (0.015) 0.032* (0.013) 
Firm size 0.038*** (0.007) 0.021# (0.012) 0.017** (0.007) 0.019# (0.011) 
Assets 0.196*** (0.015) 0.073* (0.03) 0.062* (0.031) 0.055* (0.022) 
Diversification 0.006 (0.004) 0.005 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) 0.004 (0.003) 
R&D 0.208*** (0.003) 0.172** (0.056) 0.111*** (0.029) 0.092*** (0.015) 
ADV 0.343*** (0.009) 0.205** (0.066) 0.192*** (0.049) 0.081*** (0.013) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald's Chi 14232.417 9873.209 5008.928 2812.372 
Observations 99904 99904 3130 3130 
Notes. In coloumn 3 and 4, each observation is paired with at least one observation in an adjacent year without an announcement. PECIs 
stands for publicly emphasizing cybersecurity investments, TR for talent recruitment, and ADV for advertising expenditure. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; # p < 0.10. 
 
2.4.2 Main results 
Table 2.5 presents our main analysis. From panel A in Table 5, evidence regarding H1 and H2 is 
obtained. The coefficients of PECIs are positive and significant across all subsamples (supporting 
H1). The coefficients of the interaction term with talent recruitment (TR×PECIs) are also 
significantly positive for all subsample (supporting H2). Panel B provides evidence regarding 
subsample comparison hypotheses (H3 and H4). Comparisons in the 𝑃𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑠 submatrix, included in 
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panel B, suggest that direct effect sizes are significantly larger for SS1 compared to SS2. Also, the 
coefficient in SS4 is higher significantly relative to SS2 and SS3 (supporting H3). Moreover, the 
interaction effect sizes, reported in 𝑇𝑅 × 𝑃𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑠 submatrix of the panel B, show that the coefficient 
estimates are significantly larger for both SS1 and SS4 relative to SS2 and SS3 (supporting H4). It is 
also worth noting that given the impact of PECI is complemented by the level of TR it is more 
appropriate to conduct an analysis that compares the effect size of 𝑃𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑠 + 𝑇𝑅 + 𝑇𝑅 × 𝑃𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑠, 
across the four subsamples. This analysis compares the impact of PECIs across the subsamples under 
a high value for TR. Results in the 𝑃𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑠 + 𝑇𝑅 + 𝑇𝑅 × 𝑃𝐸𝐶𝐼𝑠 submatrix of Panel B in Table 5 show 
that firms in SS1 and SS4 gain significantly higher payoffs. Taken together, the results suggest that 
while PECIs generally increase a firm’s Tobin’s 𝑞, the impact is specifically stronger for firms that 
have under- or over-performed relative to other firms in their industry. Moreover, we note that terms 
pertaining to PECIs in the absence of TR (ŋ𝑖𝑡) are only significantly positive for SS1 and SS4. This 
finding suggests that PECIs in absence of recruited talent can be met with economic benefits, but only 
for under- and over-performing firms where investors may be excessively sensitive to the publicly-
announced initiatives. 
The results show that PECIs produce higher market rewards when a firm has substantive support 
for them through talent recruitment. Ceteris paribus, a firm that has one standard deviation higher 
than average PECIs benefits form a 5 percent higher market to book value. Moreover, a firm that has 
a high PECIs and successfully recruits cybersecurity talent, at one standard deviation above what an 
average firm can recruit, can add to its market to book value gains as a result of a high PECIs by an 
average of 6 percent and as high as 13 percent (for over-performers). 
While the main analyses provide evidence of the positive business value of PECIs as well as 
value heterogeneity across the subsamples as measured by Tobin’s 𝑞, we further investigate if the 
positive value is still detectable using traditional book-keeping measures of performance, i.e., return 
on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS). We run models like those in Table 2.5 with ROA/ROS as 
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dependent variables both contemporaneously, as well as with one and two-year lags. We could only 
explore lags as deep as two because ROA could be calculated for up to 2017 for the observations in 
2015. While contemporaneous and 1-year lagged models did not detect the impacts of PECIs or TR, 
the 2-year lagged models, presented in Tables 2.6 and 2.7, show similar patterns as observed in Table 
2.5. Hence, the positive business value estimated by a forward-looking measure such as Tobin’s 𝑞 can 
be traced in the book-keeping measures with a deep enough lag. It suggests that early market rewards 
for PECIs and talent recruitment transpire in accounting measures of success a few years down the 
line.  
Table 2.5 Panel A: Main results 
2SLS + Matching 
SS1: Under-
performing firms 
SS2: On-par firms 
(high risk) 




DV=Tobin's q (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 PECIs (H1) 0.044*  0.057*  0.014#  0.015#  0.021*  0.039*  0.054*  0.064*  
 (0.021) (0.024) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.019) (0.025) (0.029) 
TR 0.075*  0.134***  0.035*  0.029*  0.014#  0.016#  0.065*  0.095***  
 (0.03) (0.031) (0.017) (0.014) (0.007) (0.009) (0.028) (0.02) 
TR×PECIs (H2)  0.057*   0.012#     0.016#     0.081**  
  (0.027)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.025) 
Firm size 0.015#  0.023*  0.007 0.004 0.009 0.014#  0.024*  0.024*  
 (0.008) (0.01) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.01) 
Assets 0.072*  0.072*  0.072*  0.049*  0.039*  0.04*  0.034*  0.041*  
 (0.029) (0.032) (0.031) (0.024) (0.017) (0.02) (0.014) (0.016) 
Diversification -0.011 -0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.011 -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.003) (0) (0) (0.004) (0.009) (0.008) 
R&D 0.224***  0.202***  0.064*  0.111***  0.068*  0.07*  0.261***  0.142***  
 (0.036) (0.033) (0.027) (0.029) (0.03) (0.028) (0.045) (0.036) 
ADV 0.158***  0.214***  0.121***  0.174***  0.203***  0.178***  0.083**  0.059*  
 (0.03) (0.053) (0.021) (0.027) (0.031) (0.043) (0.027) (0.025) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald's Chi 4911.540 2305.470 2286.900 3966.560 1887.930 883.503 1634.880 1757.600 
Observations 884 718 922 606 
Notes. Each observation is paired with at least one observation in an adjacent year without an announcement. PECIs stands for publicly 
emphasizing cybersecurity investments, TR for talent recruitment, ADV for advertising expenditure. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; # p < 0.10. 
 
Panel B: Coefficient comparisons among subsamples 
 PECIs (H3) TR×PECIs (H4) PECIs+TR+TR×PECIs 
  SS1 SS2 SS3 SS1 SS2 SS3 SS1 SS2 SS3 








SS4 0.522 0.091 0.089 0.057 0.000 0.000 0.574 0.000 0.000 
Notes. The reported numbers are p-values for Chi-squared tests (based on standard errors estimated from simultaneous equations in a GMM 
recasting of 2SLS) for coefficient differences in column 2, 4, 6, 8 of Panel A. SS1-SS2, SS1-SS3, SS4-SS2, SS4-SS3 are one-tailed (expect 
p<0.1), SS1-SS4, SS2-SS3 are two-tailed (expect p≥0.1). Results consistent with expectations are boldfaced. 
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Table 2.6 Panel A: Robustness tests with ROA 
2SLS + Matching 
SS1: Under-
performing firms 
SS2: On-par firms 
(high risk) 




DV=ROA (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 PECIs (H1) 0.04*  0.036*  0.012#  0.021*  0.034*  0.042*  0.057*  0.043*  
 (0.02) (0.018) (0.006) (0.009) (0.015) (0.021) (0.022) (0.017) 
TR 0.105***  0.096***  0.043*  0.038*  0.018#  0.021*  0.103***  0.114***  
 (0.023) (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) (0.01) (0.008) (0.016) (0.024) 
TR×PECIs (H2)    0.067*     0.009    0.008    0.119***  
  (0.034)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.035) 
Firm size 0.015#  0.013#  0.006 0.004 0.009 0.017#  0.024*  0.018#  
 (0.008) (0.007) (0.004) (0.002) (0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.01) 
Assets 0.067*  0.056*  0.043*  0.061*  0.033*  0.061*  0.016#  0.049*  
 (0.03) (0.026) (0.019) (0.024) (0.015) (0.031) (0.008) (0.022) 
Diversification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.009 -0.010 0.000 0.000 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) 
R&D 0.226***  0.155***  0.073*  0.107***  0.127***  0.126***  0.165***  0.162***  
 (0.068) (0.036) (0.032) (0.026) (0.032) (0.036) (0.03) (0.026) 
ADV 0.239***  0.153***  0.143***  0.273***  0.177***  0.133***  0.043*  0.076*  
 (0.065) (0.03) (0.024) (0.045) (0.043) (0.038) (0.019) (0.035) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald's Chi 1290.100 1893.840 825.884 1536.900 1482.030 1450.650 657.195 1469.820 
Observations 884 718 922 606 
Notes. Each observation is paired with at least one observation in an adjacent year without an announcement. PECIs stands for publicly 
emphasizing cybersecurity investments, TR for talent recruitment, ADV for advertising expenditure. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; #p < 0.10. 
 
Panel B: Coefficient comparisons among subsamples 
 PECIs (H3) TR×PECIs (H4) PECIs+TR+TR×PECIs 













SS4 0.637 0.114 0.109 0.074 0.000 0.000 0.677 0.000 0.000 
Notes. The reported numbers are p-values for Chi-squared tests (based on standard errors estimated from simultaneous equations in a GMM 
recasting of 2SLS) for coefficient differences in column 2, 4, 6, 8 of Panel A. SS1-SS2, SS1-SS3, SS4-SS2, SS4-SS3 are one-tailed (expect p<0.1), 




Table 2.7 Panel A: Robustness tests with ROS 
2SLS + Matching 
SS1: Under-
performing firms 
SS2: On-par firms 
(high risk) 




DV=ROS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 PECIs (H1) 0.025*  0.061*  0.012#  0.018#  0.023*  0.044*  0.041*  0.071*  
 (0.011) (0.029) (0.007) (0.01) (0.011) (0.018) (0.018) (0.029) 
TR 0.072*  0.136***  0.04*  0.035*  0.013#  0.023*  0.063*  0.11***  
 (0.035) (0.032) (0.016) (0.015) (0.007) (0.011) (0.026) (0.017) 
TR×PECIs (H2)    0.052*     0.009    0.012#     0.094***  
  (0.023)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.022) 
Firm size 0.015#  0.02*  0.006 0.005 0.011 0.015#  0.03*  0.022*  
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) 
Assets 0.076*  0.066*  0.05*  0.071*  0.046*  0.051*  0.019#  0.053*  
 (0.034) (0.028) (0.021) (0.031) (0.023) (0.02) (0.011) (0.021) 
Diversification 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.009 -0.010 
 (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) (0.007) 
R&D 0.258***  0.211***  0.052*  0.104***  0.105***  0.13***  0.174***  0.145***  
 (0.058) (0.046) (0.02) (0.031) (0.03) (0.02) (0.029) (0.025) 
ADV 0.169***  0.158***  0.169***  0.228***  0.141***  0.118***  0.05*  0.08**  
 (0.046) (0.032) (0.033) (0.04) (0.022) (0.018) (0.022) (0.028) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald's Chi 1324.230 1355.740 1301.120 1281.320 1288.720 1293.600 606.424 1870.360 
Observations 884 718 922 606 
Notes. Each observation is paired with at least one observation in an adjacent year without an announcement. PECIs stands for publicly 
emphasizing cybersecurity investments, TR for talent recruitment, ADV for advertising expenditure. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; #p < 0.10. 
 
Panel B: Coefficient comparisons among subsamples 
 PECIs (H3) TR×PECIs (H4) PECIs+TR+TR×PECIs 













SS4 0.626 0.098 0.112 0.073 0.000 0.000 0.746 0.000 0.000 
Notes. The reported numbers are p-values for Chi-squared tests (based on standard errors estimated from simultaneous equations in a GMM 
recasting of 2SLS) for coefficient differences in column 2, 4, 6, 8 of Panel A. SS1-SS2, SS1-SS3, SS4-SS2, SS4-SS3 are one-tailed (expect p<0.1), 
SS1-SS4, SS2-SS3 are two-tailed (expect p≥0.1). Results consistent with expectations are boldfaced. 
 
2.4.3 The value-creation mechanism 
In our theoretical discussions, we explained that we expect cybersecurity investments, 
broadcasted in SEC filings, and supported by cybersecurity talent recruitment, create value through 
reducing the cybersecurity risks, and thereby reducing the average cost of capital. While our main 
analyses provide empirical evidence that suggests PECIs and TR interact to create value (both in 
forward-looking and book-keeping measures of business value), it is imperative to provide empirical 
evidence that sheds light on the value-creating mechanism. Therefore, to further unfold the impact of 
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cybersecurity investments on subsequent security risks, we explore their security implications by 
replacing the dependent variable in Table 5 with the occurrence of a security breach in the subsequent 
year15. We note that while PECIs and TR×PECIs have a significant negative effect towards breaches 
across all subsamples, PECIs in absence of TR do not have any significant effect towards breaches 
(Table 2.7). Moreover, we estimated equation (3) while replacing the dependent variable with the cost 
of capital (Table 2.8), following Sharfman and Fernando’s (2008) measure of the weighted average 
cost of capital (WACC), which considers the general case of a firm with both equity and debt 
financing16. While R&D consistently reduces WACC across all subsamples, the results show that the 
coefficients of PECIs, TR, and PECIs×TR significantly and negatively impact WACC only in SS1 
and SS4, but not in SS2 and SS3.  
Although this analysis suggests that PECIs and TR reduce the cost of capital, it is imperative to 
rule out other outstanding sources of the cost that can also be cut due to PECIs. Otherwise, it may not 
be clear if the observed impacts on the reduction of cost of capital are due to the stakeholders’ re-
evaluation of the broader risks (e.g., long-term reputational risks), or simply due to a reduction in the 
firm’s operational costs. Specifically, since cybersecurity breaches disrupt a firm’s operations and 
increase its overhead costs, pursuing cybersecurity investments may also reduce the cost of goods 
sold. Table 9 presents the results when the cost of goods sold is considered as the dependent variable 
in estimating equation (3). While the results show that firms with more assets and higher R&D 
expenditure generally benefit from a lower cost of goods sold, PECIs and TR do not show any 
significant impact. This non-finding is aligned with the existing literature on cybersecurity breaches, 
suggesting that the operational costs of an incident disruption are only a part of the broader set of 
costs pertaining to reputation loss and the remediating strategic shifts (Kvochko and Pant 2015), and 
firms with enough slack resources can usually bounce back from operational damages. However, the 
                                                          
15 A Cox proportional hazard estimation with stratification around firm id (i.e., distinct baseline hazard for each firm) and a 
robust standard error estimation are used. The exit condition is set to happen until the next observation about the same firm 
in another year or the end of the study.  
16 See Appendix C for the full formula used in estimating WACC. 
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long-term reputational impacts, or at least a negative outlook, may be harder to overcome with slack 
resources and financial cushions. Since cost of capital determined by stakeholders considers both the 
broader legitimacy impacts of cybersecurity incidents (and thereby, the preventive impact of PECIs) 
and the immediate operational efficiencies (Sharfman and Fernando 2008), the positive and 
significant impact of PECIs and TR on cost of capital, but not on cost of goods sold (see SS1 and SS4 
in Table 9) suggests that these broader legitimacy impacts are the likely reasons for observing the 
reduction in the cost of capital.    
Table 2.8 Panel A: The hazard of a future breach 
2SLS + Matching 
SS1: Under-
performing firms 
SS2: On-par firms 
(high risk) 




DV=security hazard (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 PECIs (H1) -0.011#  -0.043*  -0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.02*  -0.062*  
 (0.006) (0.019) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.028) 
TR -0.1***  -0.071*  -0.02*  -0.010 0.000 -0.02*  -0.072*  -0.056*  
 (0.016) (0.032) (0.009) (0.006) (0.001) (0.01) (0.034) (0.026) 
TR×PECIs (H2)    -0.078**     -0.010    -0.011    -0.099***  
  (0.026)  (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.021) 
Firm size -0.010 -0.011 -0.021*  0.000 0.000 -0.022*  -0.010 -0.010 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.01) (0.004) (0.003) (0.01) (0.008) (0.008) 
Assets 0.008 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.011 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) 
Diversification -0.009 -0.009 0.000 -0.010 0.000 -0.011 0.000 -0.010 
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007) 
R&D -0.036*  -0.074*  -0.039*  -0.045*  -0.097***  -0.091**  -0.077*  -0.086**  
 (0.014) (0.034) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.029) (0.033) (0.029) 
ADV 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.010 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.008) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald's Chi 1327.200 1879.380 1252.710 1337.220 982.560 1256.310 434.250 1602.420 
Observations 884 718 922 606 
Notes. Each observation is paired with at least one observation in an adjacent year without an announcement. PECIs stands for publicly 
emphasizing cybersecurity investments, TR for talent recruitment, ADV for advertising expenditure. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; #p < 0.10. 
 
Panel B: Coefficient comparisons among subsamples 
 PECIs (H3) TR×PECIs (H4) PECIs+TR+TR×PECIs 













SS4 0.979 0.021 0.020 0.875 0.001 0.001 0.965 0.000 0.000 
Notes. The reported numbers are p-values for Chi-squared tests (based on standard errors estimated from simultaneous equations in a GMM 
recasting of 2SLS) for coefficient differences in column 2, 4, 6, 8 of Panel A. SS1-SS2, SS1-SS3, SS4-SS2, SS4-SS3 are one-tailed (expect p<0.1), 




Table 2.9 Panel A: Cost of capital 
2SLS + Matching 
SS1: Under-
performing firms 
SS2: On-par firms 
(high risk) 




DV=cost of capital (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 PECIs (H1) -0.013#  -0.032*  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.010 -0.036*  
 (0.007) (0.016) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.014) 
TR -0.077*  -0.067*  -0.022*  -0.007 0.000 -0.023 -0.064*  -0.073*  
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.005) (0.003) (0.02) (0.027) (0.03) 
TR×PECIs (H2)   -0.074*    -0.008   0.000   -0.091**  
  (0.032)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.028) 
Firm size 0.000 -0.007 -0.021*  0.000 0.000 -0.010 0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.01) (0.001) (0.001) (0.006) (0.002) (0.003) 
Assets 0.008 0.006 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.011 0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003) 
Diversification -0.013#  -0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.010 0.000 0.000 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.001) 
R&D -0.039*  -0.046*  -0.038*  -0.037*  -0.119***  -0.097***  -0.067*  -0.086**  
 (0.017) (0.021) (0.017) (0.016) (0.027) (0.018) (0.031) (0.027) 
ADV 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.009 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald's Chi 1102.890 1822.690 1076.400 905.760 983.550 725.400 421.512 1848.960 
Observations 884 718 922 606 
Notes. Each observation is paired with at least one observation in an adjacent year without an announcement. PECIs stands for publicly 
emphasizing cybersecurity investments, TR for talent recruitment, ADV for advertising expenditure. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; #p < 0.10. 
 
Panel B: Coefficient comparisons among subsamples 
 PECIs (H3) TR×PECIs (H4) PECIs+TR+TR×PECIs 













SS4 0.950 0.015 0.008 0.475 0.003 0.003 0.159 0.000 0.000 
Notes. The reported numbers are p-values for Chi-squared tests (based on standard errors estimated from simultaneous equations in a GMM 
recasting of 2SLS) for coefficient differences in column 2, 4, 6, 8 of Panel A. SS1-SS2, SS1-SS3, SS4-SS2, SS4-SS3 are one-tailed (expect p<0.1), 
SS1-SS4, SS2-SS3 are two-tailed (expect p≥0.1). Results consistent with expectations are boldfaced. 
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Table 2.10 Cost of goods sold 
2SLS + Matching 
SS1: Under-
performing firms 
SS2: On-par firms 
(high risk) 




DV=COGS (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 PECIs (H1) 0.007 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.004 0.004 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
TR 0.010 0.007 0.008 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.008 0.006 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
TR×PECIs (H2)    0.000    0.000    0.000    0.000 
  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Firm size -0.009 -0.009 0.000 -0.009 0.000 -0.010 0.000 -0.011 
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) 
Assets -0.045*  -0.056*  -0.04*  -0.056*  -0.045*  -0.035*  -0.041*  -0.031*  
 (0.023) (0.026) (0.018) (0.029) (0.022) (0.016) (0.02) (0.014) 
Diversification -0.009 -0.009 0.000 -0.009 0.000 -0.010 0.000 -0.011 
 (0.005) (0.007) (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.001) (0.007) 
R&D -0.042*  -0.078**  -0.041*  -0.051*  -0.099***  -0.104***  -0.076*  -0.086**  
 (0.019) (0.027) (0.017) (0.022) (0.022) (0.03) (0.031) (0.032) 
ADV 0.006 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.009 
 (0.005) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald's Chi 1102.050 1808.460 1185.360 1193.010 1185.480 1142.100 439.075 1633.840 
Observations 884 718 922 606 
Notes. Each observation is paired with at least one observation in an adjacent year without an announcement. PECIs stands for publicly 
emphasizing cybersecurity investments, TR for talent recruitment, ADV for advertising expenditure. ***p < 0.001; **p < 0.01; *p < 0.05; #p < 0.10. 
2.5 Discussion 
Cybersecurity has transformed from its once operational nature in the organization and turned 
into a key strategic area of focus. With such a transformation in its organizational meaning, the 
organizational inquiry about cybersecurity has also transformed: from a focus on its immediate 
impacts on cyber-risk reduction to the broader business, value-creating impacts. Specifically, while 
the preventive value of cybersecurity investments is well established and evidence exists pertaining to 
its business value, at least in a short window of reaction or relative to a limited set of investments, the 
enigma lies in connecting the dots between being protected and gaining economic rents that prevail. 
To unfold the enigma, we build on organizational theories that connect protection against risks to 
sources of profit and economic gains. We wear a legitimacy lens to view a public firm as an organism 
that survives with reputation, depends on trust, and breathes with critical financial leverage. In such a 
view, measures taken to reduce outstanding risks or remediate outstanding damages are not only 
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rewarded by operational efficiency, but also are met with an enhanced reputation, increased trust, and 
subsequently, cheaper access to debt and equity finances. The collection of our findings paints a 
picture of cybersecurity investments that: a) connects them to the book-keeping indices of sustained 
performance, b) ties them into the deeper strategic efforts of talent acquisition in competitive markets, 
c) makes them relevant to the institutional positioning of a firm relative to its peers, and d) positions 
them in a significant role in connecting to stakeholders and accessing competitive sources of 
financing. Together, these findings provide further clarity regarding the strategic transformation of 
cybersecurity in organizations.           
This study is not without its limitations. First, our dataset on PECI is limited to those that are 
publicly available. While this fits with our focus on the stakeholders’ reactions, some cybersecurity 
investments may not be announced to protect the integrity of the initiatives. Second, security 
breaches, in general, tend to be under-reported (Amir et al. 2018) since managers are incentivized to 
withhold potentially damaging information from the public, and such under-reporting may bias the 
estimates. Third, our examination of the lagged impact on book-keeping measures of performance is 
limited to only two years due to the short and unbalanced nature of the panel. We acknowledge that 
the long-term impacts of cybersecurity investments require further empirical scrutiny in future 
research. Despite its limitations, this paper has a few important contributions. 
First, this study reveals and quantifies the complementary role of security expertise in creating 
value from cybersecurity investments. Prior literature has pointed out the essential role of substantive 
adoption of security technology in mitigating security threats (Angst et al. 2017; Kwon and Johnson 
2018). We extend this literature, which has identified general institutional characteristics, such as size 
and entrepreneurship orientation, influencing the substantiveness of cybersecurity investments, by 
introducing and empirically evaluating the role of one critical cyber-specific characteristics, i.e., 
cybersecurity talent. This finding ties this stream of research in cybersecurity to the general literature 
on BVIT that has highlighted the direct value of IT labor (e.g., Tambe 2014) and provides empirical 
evidence showcasing its complementary role in increasing value reaped from ongoing organizational 
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investments and initiatives. This integration is more critical in a salient context such as cybersecurity 
where there is a significant talent shortage.  
Second, this study offers a framework to explain the value heterogeneity of publicly emphasized 
cybersecurity investments by showing why some public emphases are more valuable for over- and 
under-performing firms than for those that are performing as expected in terms of their relative 
vulnerabilities. Building on the literature related to organizational legitimacy and BTOF, as well as 
the literature outlining security breach motives (Cremonini and Nizovtsev 2009), the study shows that 
the valuation of cybersecurity investments not only depends on the firm itself but also on the relative 
stance of the firm while considering industry benchmarks. While the social comparison account has 
recently been utilized in studying the BVIT literature (Ho et al. 2017), we extend its use to 
understanding the value of publicly emphasizing information security investments. The study offers a 
framework to build industry benchmarks when the assessment of cybersecurity investments is 
concerned. In addition to its theoretical implications, the study examines a sample which spans a wide 
variety of cybersecurity investments in different industries, adding to the rich knowledge accumulated 
in VCI studies that either focus on a specific type of cybersecurity investment (e.g., Bose and Leung 
2019) or a particular industry (e.g., Angst et al. 2017).  
Finally, and most importantly, the study extends the work on the business and preventive value of 
publicly emphasized cybersecurity investments (e.g., Gordon et al. 2010; Angst et al. 2017) by 
theoretically discussing and empirically unfolding an important mechanism that can explain how the 
preventive value of cybersecurity turns into business value. Building on the legitimacy view, which 
positions stakeholders in central roles both in assessing the firm’s legitimacy and in regulating the 
costs of its access to capital, we show that patterns of reducing cybersecurity hazard through PECIs 
and TR are matched when the impact of those factors on the firm’s cost of capital is considered.  
Therefore, our study recognizes the risk-reducing nature of cybersecurity investments and builds on 
the general strategic management studies that had highlighted the value-creating path of other risk-
reducing investments (e.g., Sharfman and Fernando 2008). In doing so, we establish an important link 
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between the preventive and business value of cybersecurity investments.  Moreover, we unfold that 
the PECIs do not significantly impact the operational costs (i.e., cost of goods sold). While previous 
research on BVIT has highlight the role of general IT in reducing operational costs (Santhanam and 
Hartono 2003), this finding contrasts the cost-reduction nature of cybersecurity investments with that 
of general IT.    
For practitioners, the finding pertaining to the impact of PECIs in reducing the firm’s cost of 
capital, but not reducing the operational costs, changes the ways that executives incentivize and 
champion for cybersecurity investments. While a limited operational look at impacted costs may not 
capture the full effect of cybersecurity investments, focusing on the broader structure of costs of 
accessing debt and equity financing may provide a clearer picture. Further, since the market 
profitability of cybersecurity investments can also be traced in later values of traditional accounting 
indices, managers should allow enough time elapse before they scrutinize their firm’s financial 
reports to quantify such benefits. Nonetheless, once enough time is elapsed, they can rely on more 
direct book-keeping evidence to appraise their current cybersecurity efforts and champion for future 
plans. The findings also highlight the importance of scrutinizing and enhancing recruitment policies 
that allow a firm to attract the hot and rare cybersecurity expertise, parallel with the public 
emphasizing of their cybersecurity investments. Further, this study has revealed an industry 
benchmark framework that can be used by top executives to evaluate the promise of PECIs and 
manage market reactions. The framework allows the championing executives to assess the firm's 
relative vulnerability in the underlying industry, and actively interpret the under-, over-, and on-par 






CHAPTER III: CORPORATE VENTURE CAPITAL IN CYBERSECURITY17 
3.1 Introduction 
 “So long as there are black hats, there will need to be white hats” (Pettit 2018). With the 
ever-increasing and costlier data breaches (Accenture 2017), entrepreneurship in cybersecurity is 
also booming (Peterson 2017; Peterson 2018; Pettit 2018), which attracted independent and 
corporate venture capitals alike. Unlike independent venture capitals that are purely profit-
motivated, corporate investors are interested in cybersecurity startups for security sake. Gaining 
access to cutting-edge cybersecurity technologies could potentially save a company millions of 
dollars (Accenture 2017) and avoid public embarrassment as well as legal entanglements from 
data breaches. In addition, investing in an infant-stage blue-chip company could generate 
considerable future returns. On the other hand, shareholders may be skeptical towards such 
investments, since ventures in new-born companies may involve greater uncertainty relative to in-
house R&D. Moreover, investment in cybersecurity is traditionally viewed as a cost of doing 
business rather than a profit-generating production factor (Kvochko and Pant 2015). As a mixture 
of security measures and corporate venture capital, organizational investment in cybersecurity 
startups can be profit-oriented or as a necessary cost element. Therefore, the business value of 
organizational investments in cybersecurity startups is unclear, and needs to be investigated 
empirically.  
Studies of organizational investment in cybersecurity startups lie in the intersection of 
cybersecurity investment and corporate venture capital (CVC) literature. Researches on 
cybersecurity investment typically address disclosures of security-related initiatives (Chai et al. 
2011; Gordon et al. 2010; Wang et al. 2013), and analytic assessments of  cybersecurity  
                                                          
17 We thank the participants at the 2018 Wharton Innovation Doctoral Symposium. 
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investment (Benaroch 2018; Cavusoglu et al. 2008; Wang et al. 2008). While direct investments in 
cybersecurity are generally associated with positive market reaction (Chai et al. 2011), it is not clear 
whether indirect cybersecurity investments through startups would generate similar outcomes. On the 
other hand, general CVC literature has documented the profitability of corporate investments in 
startups (Benson and Ziedonis 2009; Benson and Ziedonis 2010; Dushnitsky and Lenox 2006) and 
how value is transmitted from a startup to the investing firm (Chemmanur et al. 2014; Wadhwa and 
Kotha 2006). Recent CVC studies have covered emergent industries such as big data (Havakhor and 
Sabherwal 2018). CVC in cybersecurity is unique in the sense that cybersecurity capability is 
typically not regarded as a rent-seeking element  (Kvochko and Pant 2015). In both streams of 
literature, the value of organizational investment in cybersecurity startup is understudied. To fill this 
void, this study investigates whether organizational investments in cybersecurity startups create 
business value for the investing firm (RQ). 
This study adopts a theoretical lens that considers organizational investment in cybersecurity 
startups as a form of “real options”, which provides the organization with future choices and potential 
for proprietary access to technology, expertise and monetary gains (McGrath et al. 2004). The real 
options reasoning is suitable for IT investments under uncertainty (Schwartz and Zozaya-Gorostiza 
2003), particularly for technology positioning investment (McGrath 1997). With cybersecurity threats 
on the rise, corporations are better prepared for the future by purchasing “real options” to access 
cutting-edge cybersecurity technologies and expertise. Due to uncertainties in the cybersecurity 
realm, real options also provide alternatives for organizations that are not fully committed to 
acquiring novel technologies. Prior CVC literature has implicitly adopted the real options lens by 
suggesting that corporate investments in startups provide a window for the latest technologies 
(Benson and Ziedonis 2009). While abundant IT investment literature addressed real options pricing 
(Benaroch and Kauffman 2000; Herath and Herath 2008; Taudes et al. 2000), this study focuses on 
the market valuation of CVC investments in cybersecurity through the theoretical lens of real options.  
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Data on CVC funding in cybersecurity startups are gathered from Crunchbase, a database that 
tracks funding and acquisitions of startups. Cybersecurity startups were identified using the venture 
categories and keyword search in Crunchbase. The CVC investment data was augmented with the 
investing firms’ performance data from Computstat and CRSP. The economic impacts of CVC 
investments in cybersecurity are examined through a sample of 873 firm-year observations spanning 
from 2009 to 2017. Data up to 2008 were discarded to minimize the effect of the financial crisis in the 
sample. The results indicate an overall positive effect of organizational investments in cybersecurity 
startups on the investing firms’ Tobin’s 𝑞. The effect is robust when tested using two conservative 
measures, return on assets and return on sales. In addition, the positive impact is stronger for IT firms 
and for investments made in recent years, where security breaches have become more prevalent and 
costlier (Accenture 2017).  
This paper contributes to the economics of cybersecurity literature by providing evidence of 
profitability in indirect cybersecurity investments through startups, suggesting that the real options 
into future cybersecurity technology and expertise are valuable to organizational investors. The study 
also adds to the CVC literature by revealing the tangible value of organizational investments in non-
rent-seeking technologies. For practitioners, this paper will shed light on how investors react towards 
organizations tapping into future cybersecurity technologies through CVC investments. The rest of 
the article is organized as follows. We first review relevant literature on CVC and real options, before 
developing hypotheses in §3.2. Data collection and analyses are presented in §3.3 and §3.4, 
respectively. Finally, we discuss the limitations and implications in §3.5. 
3.2 Theory development 
3.2.1 Corporate venture capital 
Corporate venture capital (CVC) is an investment by an established firm in entrepreneurial 
ventures. CVC typically creates values for the investing companies through two channels. First, 
“direct financial benefits from CVC due to privileged knowledge in selecting valuable ventures and 
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the possession of complementary assets that enhance the value of their portfolio companies” 
(Dushnitsky and Lenox 2006). Second, CVC may offer a valuable window of new technology that 
potentially opens pathways for future opportunities (Benson and Ziedonis 2009; Dushnitsky and 
Lenox 2006). While a few million funding could make a difference for an infant-stage company, the 
amount is dwarfed in comparison with the financial capabilities of the investing firms. For this 
reason, corporate investments may be less concerned with short-term financial gains. Indeed, gaining 
a window on new technologies is a prominent motive for CVC investing (Benson and Ziedonis 2009), 
whereas a short-term focus on financial objectives may inhibit long-term strategic benefits from 
external innovations through CVC investments (Ernst et al. 2005). 
Value creations of CVC for the investing firms are subject to various internal and external factors. 
Internally, strategically focused CVC investments will create greater value than financially focused 
CVC investments (Dushnitsky and Lenox 2006); stable CVC programs lead to better performance 
(Benson and Ziedonis 2009); the investors’ absorptive capacities of startups positively affect the 
innovation rate and consequently value-creation of CVC (Dushnitsky and Lenox 2005a; Dushnitsky 
and Lenox 2005b); R&D expenditure plays a complementary role in value creations by CVC 
investments (Benson and Ziedonis 2009); corporate investors’ technological knowledge diversity and 
involvement in startups enhance knowledge creation by CVC investments (Wadhwa and Kotha 
2006). Externally, uncertain environments for CVC-backed ventures tend to benefit the startups (Park 
and Steensma 2012), and likely the investing firms as well through increased investment returns. In 
addition, uncertainties in investing firms’ environment will moderate the relationships between CVC 
investments and market reactions (Havakhor and Sabherwal 2018). Together, these confounding 
factors will affect the value of CVC investments.  
On top of structural deficiencies of general CVCs (Chesbrough 2000; Sykes 1986), the business 
value of cybersecurity CVCs, in particular, can be murky due to its unique characteristics. While 
CVC investments harnessing novel technologies are associated with positive firm performance 
(Dushnitsky and Lenox 2006), cybersecurity CVC, as a form of indirect cybersecurity investments, 
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seems closer to a necessary cost than a production factor (Kvochko and Pant 2015). In this regard, the 
profitability of cybersecurity CVC is questionable. On the other hand, cybersecurity CVC possesses 
certain attributes implying positive firm performance. Cybersecurity management is a knowledge-
intensive activity (Belsis et al. 2005), and investing in cybersecurity startups is a fast way to 
potentially gain access to the latest cybersecurity technologies and expertise, which will help protect 
shareholders’ value in the event of a cyber-threat. In addition, high uncertainties in the cybersecurity 
industry (Baker 2018) will be beneficial to CVC-backed startups (Park and Steensma 2012), which 
will, in turn, increase the profitability of CVC investments. With conflicting arguments supporting 
both profitability and non-profitability of cybersecurity CVC, we proceed with the real options lens to 
better capture the future value of cybersecurity technologies.  
3.2.2 Real options 
It has been suggested that uncertain investments should be viewed through a real options lens 
(Dixit and Pindyck 1994). Adapted from financial options, a real option is a right, but not the 
obligation, to obtain the benefits associated with some physical assets (Fichman 2004). As a type of 
experimentation under uncertainties, venture capital investments can be conceptualized through a real 
options lens (Kerr et al. 2014). In particular, CVC investments entail valuable real options by offering 
the investing organization choices to increase, decrease, or defer substantial investments (Tong and Li 
2011). Real options has also been applied in cybersecurity investment, although the emphasis has 
been placed on option pricing analytics (Benaroch 2018; Gordon et al. 2003; Herath and Herath 
2008). We adopt the real options lens to examine CVC investments in cybersecurity startups, a 
combination of CVC and cybersecurity investments. 
CVC investments in cybersecurity are typically motivated by two factors: technology positioning 
and future profit, both of which are compatible with the real options approach. Technology 
positioning investment in cybersecurity startups creates proprietary future access to technology 
(Benson and Ziedonis 2009; McGrath 1997), which would enhance the investing firm’s competitive 
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advantage in terms of cybersecurity capability. On the other hand, profit-oriented organizational 
investments in startups are similar to venture capitalists’ experimentation behavior, which generates 
exclusive rights for future pursuits (Kerr et al. 2014). In short, investments in cybersecurity startups 
create real options enabling technological and financial flexibilities (Tong and Li 2011; Trigeorgis 
1993). 
To apply the real options reasoning, a technology investment needs to satisfy three prerequisites: 
uncertainty in net payoffs, irreversibility in project costs, and managerial flexibility regarding the 
structure of the project (Dixit and Pindyck 1994). For the first condition, failure in entrepreneurship is 
known to be pervasive (Dimov and De Clercq 2006; Haswell and Holmes 1989; McGrath 1999), 
especially for the cybersecurity industry (Baker 2018). These failures can be caused by several 
reasons. For instance, cybersecurity innovation by the startup may fail to match the evolving 
techniques behind cyber-attacks (Baker 2018). 
In addition, the investing firm’s environmental uncertainty may also induce uncertainty in net 
payoffs (Havakhor and Sabherwal 2018). Moreover, investment in cybersecurity is traditionally 
viewed as a necessary cost-of-doing-business (Kvochko and Pant 2015), which adds to the 
uncertainty regarding net payoffs when mixed with profit motives of CVC investments. Regarding 
the second condition, organizational investments in startups are at least irreversible in the short run. 
While an investor may choose to sell its stakes in a startup, it could be challenging to find a buyer 
before the startup go public. Corporate investment in startups may also be irreversible in the long run 
if the investing company entered into a joint venture agreement with another party, which would be 
difficult to dissolve due to contractual obligations. 
Finally, managers have ample flexibility in approaching cybersecurity startup investments. The 
manager has the flexibility to decide which startup to invest in, how much to invest, and whether to 
keep investing in the future. Apart from process flexibility, the manager is also flexible in interpreting 
the purpose of the investment. Investment in cybersecurity startups may be for financial speculations, 
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strengthening the investing firm’s cybersecurity capability, or both. Hence, all three conditions for the 
real options reasoning hold for organizational investments in cybersecurity startups. 
As a form of real options, CVC investments in cybersecurity will be met with economic rent for 
several reasons. Firstly, the real options is valuable in providing a window of opportunity for the 
latest cybersecurity technologies (Benson and Ziedonis 2009; Chemmanur et al. 2014; Park and 
Steensma 2012). With proprietary access to such technology, corporate investors can potentially 
mitigate future cyber-attacks, and capitalize on cybersecurity-related patents. An increase in 
digitalization (e.g. IoT) and hacking capabilities will make cutting-edge cybersecurity technologies 
even more indispensable. Consequently, the real options value of relevant cybersecurity technologies 
and expertise will continue to grow. 
Secondly, while many cybersecurity startups go bankrupt within a few years (Baker 2018), 
uncertainty in the cybersecurity industry can potentially increase the value of CVC investments. 
Uncertainty is known to increase the real options value (Bloom and Van Reenen 2002; Tong and Li 
2011), since securing complementary resources is more critical under uncertainties (Park and 
Steensma 2012). In addition, since acquiring IT startups in early stages is recommended under 
uncertainties (Ransbotham and Mitra 2010), CVC provides the option to defer potential acquisitions. 
Thus, CVC as a real option is particularly valuable in the uncertain cybersecurity industry. 
Thirdly, with more media exposure of cybersecurity incidents, investors have conceivably 
become more aware of the consequences of data breaches and react positively towards counter-breach 
initiatives (e.g. cybersecurity CVC). Faced with potential economic consequences of data breaches 
(Campbell et al. 2003; Cavusoglu et al. 2004), investors will likely react positively towards indirect 
security investment (CVC), as they do with direct cybersecurity investments (Chai et al. 2011). 
Despite possible numbing towards prevalent data breaches, counter-breach initiatives are found to be 
associated with higher firm performance (Havakhor et al. 2018). Hence, investors will likely consider 
cybersecurity as an important issue to incentivize it by providing increased equity. 
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Finally, assuming market efficiency in dealing with real options, market investors are capable of 
evaluating the risks and benefits of investing in real options as they do with financial options (Cohen 
et al. 1972). Combined with an overall positive option value of cybersecurity CVC, we posit a 
positive association between cybersecurity CVC and firm performance. 
3.3. Method 
3.3.1 Data and sample 
The hypothesis was evaluated based on a dataset of corporate investments in cybersecurity 
startups. To avoid any potential bias due to the 2008 financial crisis, only investments occurred after 
December 2008 were examined. We first identified cybersecurity startups using the categories in 
Crunchbase. Selected startup categories include “cybersecurity”, “network security”, “cloud 
security”, “fraud detection”, “intrusion detection”, “identity management”, etc. Next, organizational 
investors were identified based on investor categories. Eliminated investors were mainly independent 
venture capital (IVC) firms and angel investors. 
After linking corporate investors with cybersecurity startups, we manually checked whether each 
investor was a regular organization (non-IVC). To test the effect of CVC investments on firm 
performance, organizational investors were confined to public firms or subsidiaries of public 
companies. Data from Crunchbase were merged with market data from CRSP and accounting data 
from Compustat by a fuzzy match of organization names. The name matches were then manually 
checked based on publicly available information. The final dataset consists of 873 firm-year 
observations, with 105 organizations that invested in 225 cybersecurity startups from 2009 to 2017.  
3.3.2 Measures 
The business value of investments in cybersecurity startups was assessed by the impact on a 
firm’s Tobin’s 𝑞, a ratio of market value versus book value. Tobin’s 𝑞 is considered appropriate in 
evaluating IT-related investments (Chari et al. 2008) since it is market-oriented and less sensitive to 
accounting practices (Bharadwaj et al. 1999). In our case, investments in cybersecurity startups create 
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real options that offer future access to proprietary technology as well as talent pools from the startup 
companies. Hence, the impact is best captured by Tobin’s 𝑞, a forward-looking measure. A greater 
than 1.0 Tobin’s 𝑞 value indicates a positive investors’ outlook for the real options values.  Following 
(Bharadwaj et al. 1999), Tobin’s 𝑞 ratio is defined as  
𝑞 =
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦+ 𝑙𝑖𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
. 
To assess a firm’s investments in cybersecurity startups, we utilize two measures: a) a 0/1 dummy 
variable that is set at 1 if the firm makes an investment in one or more cybersecurity startups in a 
particular year (Sec. Inv.); b) the number of cybersecurity startups the firm invests in (Sec. Inv. 
Num.) in a year. While Crunchbase provides the amount of funding startups receive in each funding 
round, there is no information on the exact funding amount from each investor, as most funding 
rounds typically involve multiple investors. Hence, we resort to the dummy variable and investment 
counts. 
We control for several industry- and firm-level variables. For industry-level controls, we define 
industries at the two-digit SIC code level. Industry concentration is estimated according to Herfindahl 
index as the market share of the top four companies in the industry. Industry 𝑞 is calculated as the 
weighted average by total assets of each firm’s Tobin’s 𝑞 in the industry. Industry capital intensity is 
also weighted by total assets. On the firm-level, typical financial variables are controlled. Capital 
intensity is the ratio between capital expenditure and total assets. Market share is the firm’s 
percentage of sales in the two-digit SIC coded industry. Firm size is calculated as the natural log of 
the number of employees in the firm. R&D and advertising expenditure are estimated using the 
investment amount divided by the firm’s annual revenue. Table 3.1 presents the mean and standard 






Table 3.1. Correlation Table 
  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Tobin's 𝑞 1.551 1.748 1          
2 Ind. Con. 0.214 0.182 0.262 1         
3 Industry 𝑞 1.132 0.852 0.403 0.418 1        
4 Ind. Cap. Int. 0.027 0.022 0.117 0.152 0.410 1       
5 Cap. Intensity 0.030 0.037 0.184 0.025 0.123 0.381 1      
6 Market Share 0.029 0.049 -0.013 0.463 0.044 -0.037 -0.061 1     
7 Size 2.916 2.073 -0.233 -0.124 -0.229 0.099 0.116 0.394 1    
8 R&D 0.050 0.079 0.283 -0.060 0.299 0.260 0.024 -0.168 -0.316 1   
9 ADV 0.012 0.034 0.147 0.291 0.147 0.091 0.202 -0.024 -0.119 0.018 1  
10 Sec. Inv. 0.184 0.387 0.044 0.062 0.058 0.023 -0.027 0.154 0.093 0.004 0.046 1 
𝑁 = 873. Ind. Con. = Industry concentration; Ind. Cap. Int. = Industry capital intensity; Sec. Inv. = Investment in cybersecurity startup 
3.4 Analysis 
To assess the effect of cybersecurity-related CVC investments on firm performance, the 
following equation is estimated. 
𝑞𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 ⋅ 𝑠𝑒𝑐_𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ⋅ 𝑖𝑛𝑑_𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ⋅ 𝑖𝑛𝑑_𝑞𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 ⋅ 𝑖𝑛𝑑_𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 ⋅ 𝑐𝑎𝑝_𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6 ⋅
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡_𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7 ⋅ 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8 ⋅ 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9 ⋅ 𝑎𝑑𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌 + 𝜖𝑖𝑡,                    
(3.1) 
where subscripts 𝑖, 𝑡 denote firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡, and 𝜖𝑖𝑡 is the error term. We also test an alternative 
model with the security investment dummy (Sec. Inv.) replaced by the number of cybersecurity 
startups a firm invests in (Sec. Inv. Num.). In addition to year fixed effects, we include industry fixed 
effects instead of firm fixed effects due to the relatively small sample size. Firm-wise standard errors 
are clustered in the regression estimation. 
Table 3.2 presents the main regression results. Based on the fixed-effect model (equation 1), we 
observe a significant positive effect of cybersecurity CVC investments towards the investing firms’ 
Tobin’s 𝑞. The positive effect hold for both the dummy variable (Sec. Inv.) and the number of 
investments (Sec. Inv. Num.). Notably, the effect size is larger and more significant for the main 
model using the cybersecurity CVC dummy, suggesting that investors may be more sensitive to the 
fact that organizations engage in cybersecurity CVC(s) than the extent of the engagement. Overall, 





Table 3.2. Main Results 
DV=Tobin’s 𝑞 Coefficient S.E. Coefficient S.E. 
Sec. Inv. 0.246** 0.116   
Sec. Inv. Num.   0.104* 0.056 
Ind. Con. 2.852** 1.181 2.853** 1.179 
Industry 𝑞 -0.147 0.193 -0.145 0.193 
Ind. Cap. Int. -6.324 4.408 -6.377 4.423 
Cap Intensity 8.259** 3.214 8.262** 3.236 
Market Share 0.378 2.535 0.331 2.549 
Size -0.063 0.076 -0.063 0.076 
R&D 4.834*** 1.734 4.844*** 1.748 
ADV 0.051 3.670 0.145 3.672 
Constant 1.047** 0.466 1.054** 0.465 
     
Fixed Effects Industry & Year Industry & Year 
Observations  873 873 
R-squared 0.364 0.363 
∗  𝑝 <  0.10; ∗∗  𝑝 <  0.05; ∗∗∗  𝑝 <  0.01. Ind. Con. = Industry concentration; Ind. 
Cap. Int. = Industry capital intensity; Sec. Inv. = Investment in cybersecurity 
startups; Sec. Inv. Num. = number of investment in cybersecurity startups 
 
 
Table 3.3. Robustness Checks 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Current Year ROA Next Year ROA Current Year ROS Next Year ROS 
     
Sec. Inv. 0.019* 0.021* 0.747* 0.834 
 (0.011) (0.012) (0.442) (0.583) 
Industry Con. 0.136* 0.161** -1.931 2.172 
 (0.070) (0.072) (1.499) (1.711) 
Industry 𝑞 0.009 0.009 -0.203 -0.534 
 (0.026) (0.015) (0.391) (0.585) 
Ind. Cap. Int. 0.198 0.226 16.449 8.227 
 (0.397) (0.326) (13.063) (10.165) 
Cap Intensity 0.008 0.138 -10.368 -0.550 
 (0.247) (0.171) (8.132) (2.355) 
Market Share -0.377 -0.471** 1.176 -13.933 
 (0.237) (0.228) (5.701) (9.766) 
Size 0.025** 0.028*** -0.034 0.697 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.205) (0.482) 
R&D -1.293** -0.425* -66.657** -10.079 
 (0.508) (0.249) (27.989) (10.263) 
ADV -0.015 0.146 0.386 6.148 
 (0.325) (0.221) (14.412) (5.222) 
Constant -0.058 -0.049 3.411 -1.285 
 (0.066) (0.037) (2.072) (1.163) 
Fixed Effects Industry & Year Industry & Year Industry & Year Industry & Year 
Observations 875 758 874 757 
R-squared 0.462 0.344 0.577 0.217 
∗  𝑝 <  0.10; ∗∗  𝑝 <  0.05; ∗∗∗  𝑝 <  0.01. Ind. Con. = Industry concentration; Ind. Cap. Int. = Industry 





While Table 3.2 points to the positive effect of cybersecurity CVCs towards Tobin’s 𝑞, it is not 
clear whether the market-oriented valuation is realized in firms’ bottom-line values assessed by 
traditional accounting measures. Robustness was tested by replacing the dependent variable Tobin’s 𝑞 
with return on assets (ROA) and return on sales (ROS). The results are reported in table 3. In both 
ROA and ROS models, the effect size of cybersecurity CVCs increases from year 𝑡 to 𝑡 + 1, 
demonstrating the lag effects of the traditional accounting measures. Taken together, the profitability 
impact of cybersecurity CVC becomes more visible over time. 
Since the main motive for CVC investments is to gain a window of opportunities on the latest 
technologies (Benson and Ziedonis 2009), and cybersecurity technologies may carry different weights 
for different types of firms, the effect of CVC on firm performance may differ based on the nature of 
the business. For instance, IT firms may possess higher absorptive capabilities for cybersecurity 
technologies than non-IT firms, hence they will likely benefit more from CVC investments in 
cybersecurity (Dushnitsky and Lenox 2005a; Dushnitsky and Lenox 2005b). Additionally, IT firms 
are more likely to have related R&D investments, which are known to complement CVC investments 
(Benson and Ziedonis 2009). As such, the main model was tested on subsamples of IT and non-IT 
firms. The firms were categorized based on two-digit SIC codes. As expected, the effect of 
cybersecurity CVC is larger and more significant for IT firms (Table 3.4).  
Apart from firm types, we also take into consideration the macro cybersecurity environment. 
Since cybersecurity incidents have been on the rise in the past decade (Accenture 2017), we expect a 
more pronounced effect in recent years. The firm-year sample was split into two parts based on the 
year. From January 2009 to June 2013, cyber risk is considered relatively low. From July 2013 to 
December 2017, cyber risk is considered relatively high. Under higher cyber-risks, cybersecurity 
technology would be valued higher. Thus, more recent investments in cybersecurity startups will 
generate more business value. Indeed, the subsample analysis suggests the effect is stronger and more 




Table 3.4. Subsample Analyses 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
DV = Tobin’s 𝑞 IT Firms Non-IT Firms High Cyber Risk Low Cyber Risk 
     
Sec. Inv. 0.368* 0.061 0.335** 0.074 
 (0.185) (0.105) (0.142) (0.208) 
Industry Con. 2.653* 2.700* 3.664** 2.345** 
 (1.572) (1.407) (1.583) (1.017) 
Industry 𝑞 0.351 -0.293 -0.263 -0.560 
 (0.288) (0.214) (0.319) (0.546) 
Ind. Cap. Int. -13.418 -11.326 -6.051 -1.487 
 (8.033) (12.025) (5.358) (5.827) 
Cap Intensity 6.782 10.172*** 1.947 14.981*** 
 (4.532) (3.404) (2.253) (5.145) 
Market Share 1.291 1.987 -0.659 0.144 
 (4.782) (2.992) (2.867) (2.164) 
Size -0.309* -0.006 0.014 -0.103 
 (0.156) (0.085) (0.071) (0.081) 
R&D 6.079** 4.115** 5.056** 6.245*** 
 (2.764) (1.849) (1.972) (1.848) 
ADV 2.674 1.483 0.644 -0.256 
 (5.732) (3.618) (4.758) (3.696) 
Constant 1.223** 1.121* 0.756* 1.258* 
 (0.605) (0.623) (0.435) (0.651) 
     
Fixed Effects Industry & Year Industry & Year Industry & Year Industry & Year 
Observations 320 553 472 401 
R-squared 0.403 0.385 0.428 0.395 
∗  𝑝 <  0.10; ∗∗  𝑝 <  0.05; ∗∗∗  𝑝 <  0.01. Ind. Con. = Industry concentration; Ind. Cap. Int. = Industry 
capital intensity; Sec. Inv. = Investment in cybersecurity startups. 
 
3.5 Discussion 
Overall, the findings of this study suggest that CVC investments in cybersecurity are met with 
positive economic rewards, although the intensity of such rewards may depend on the business nature 
of the investing firm and the macro cybersecurity risk-level. In addition, our findings suggest that 
accounting measures of profitability (ROA, ROS) are also positively associated with corporate 
investments in cybersecurity startups.  
Before discussing the implications of the findings, we acknowledge some limitations of this 
study. First, only public firms are included in the sample to ensure the availability of firm 
performance data. Some sizable private corporations may also engage in CVC in cybersecurity. While 
private companies may be less susceptible to reputation damage associated with data breaches, they 
are still subject to financial losses as well as government fines, hence will likely benefit from 
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cybersecurity CVCs as well. Second, we did not incorporate environmental uncertainties for the 
investing firms in our model. Further studies can tease apart the environmental factors (environmental 
dynamism, complexity, munificence) for the investing firms (Xue et al. 2012). As we focused on one 
industry (cybersecurity) for startups, environmental uncertainty for startups was assumed to be 
consistent in each year. Third, since the knowledge creation rate and the number of CVC investments 
have a curvilinear relationship (Wadhwa and Kotha 2006), the relationship between the number of 
CVC investments and firm performance will likely follow a similar pattern. Initially, with only a few 
investments, investors may react strongly towards a high knowledge creation rate as a result of CVC 
investments. As investments grow in number, the marginal benefit may decrease. Our linear treatment 
did not take into account such intricacies, which may be a possible reason for a less significant result 
in the second model in table 2.  
Despite these limitations, this paper has a few theoretical implications. The study contributes to 
the literature on three fronts. First, this paper adds to the economics of cybersecurity literature by 
demonstrating the overall positive value of organizational investments in cybersecurity startups, 
despite the cost nature of general cybersecurity investments. Second, parallel to the profitability of 
direct cybersecurity investments (Chai et al. 2011), this study demonstrates the positive value of 
indirect cybersecurity investments through investments in relevant startups. Although investments in 
startups can be risky, it provides a window for cutting edge technologies and expertise that are less 
accessible by direct cybersecurity investments. We have shown that these forward-looking 
investments, conceptualized as real options, also enhance firm value. Third, the paper adds to the 
CVC literature by revealing the tangible value of organizational investments in non-rent-seeking 
technologies. While CVC literature has utilized the real options lens in evaluating investment choices 
(Tong and Li 2011) and general technology acquisitions (Ceccagnoli et al. 2017), the study suggests 
that a seemingly less profit-oriented technology can also generate positive real option values, and 
consequently increases firm value. 
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For managers, this paper has revealed the profitability of a new avenue for cybersecurity 
investments. With ever-increasing hacking threats, companies need to possess the most up-to-date 
cybersecurity technologies. While direct investments in current cybersecurity technologies are 
essential, cybersecurity technologies may become outdated more quickly than other types of 
technologies such as enterprise resource planning systems. Apart from passively matching the current 
technology, companies can acquire options for future cybersecurity technologies and talent pools 
through indirect cybersecurity investments in startups. As a forward-looking cybersecurity measure 
and investment strategy, CVC investments in cybersecurity also add tangible value to the firm. 
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CHAPTER IV: CYBERSECURITY LEGISLATION AND DIGITIZATION18 
4.1 Introduction 
Digitization, i.e., using information technologies (IT) and computational services to automate, 
streamline, and intelligize work processes and their end products, has been the cornerstone of 
economic growth and prosperity in the past two decades. At the same time, the uptake in 
digitization has coincided with the rise of cybersecurity breaches that target digital records and 
traces, and in many cases, threaten the economic viability of growing and established 
corporations alike. As such, identifying cybersecurity breaches and handling them effectively has 
become a key area of investment with a cost nature to shield corporations from the unintended 
consequences of digitization. Therefore, organizations undergoing digitization efforts are 
continually faced with a difficult question: do the costs of dealing with the rising cybersecurity 
threats turn digitization efforts to less attractive options? For the policymakers concerning digital 
development, the question morphs into whether or not the costs of dealing with cybersecurity 
threats set entry barriers for digitizing entities and stifle digital growth. 
A straight-forward answer to the above questions is hard to obtain at a corporate level 
because identifying canceled or reduced-in-size plans of digitization, as well as understanding the 
internal cost-benefit calculus behind such plans, is cumbersome due to a lack of detailed public 
records. However, legal changes triggering an increase in cybersecurity expenditure provide an 
opportunity to find some answers to those questions. This study capitalizes on one such 
opportunity. 
                                                          
18 We thank the participants of the 2019 ICIS, 2019 ICIS doctoral consortium, 2019 AMCIS doctoral consortium, 
Mohammad Saifur Rahman, Gurpreet Dhillon, and Shuyuan Mary Ho. 
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By the end of 2018, all states in the US have passed security breach notification laws (SBNLs), 
requiring organizations to notify consumers and other entities19 regarding breach of personal 
identifiable information. While SBNLs reduce risks for consumers (Kwon and Johnson 2014; 
Romanosky et al. 2011) and shareholders (Ashraf and Sunder 2018), the imposed compliance costs 
on organizations could incur barriers for digitization initiatives. These barriers may be magnified by 
the increased cyber-threats (Sen 2018) and the shortage of cybersecurity talents (Zadelhoff 2017). It is 
therefore important to understand the broader questions discussed above by studying how SBNLs 
affect digitization. Since the main procurers of digitization are IT service firms and employment is a 
fundamental indicator of economic dynamism (Bravo-Biosca et al. 2016), we focus on the influence 
of SBNLs on the increase or decrease in employment by IT service industries.  
SBNLs will impact IT service firms in several ways. On one hand, mandatory reporting 
requirements further expose organizations to financial and reputational loss associated with data 
breaches. Firms with existing digital infrastructure will be incentivized to increase cybersecurity 
budgets, thus creating jobs for cybersecurity firms, a subset of IT service providers. Enhanced 
security will also boost consumer trust in digital goods and services, thereby benefiting general IT 
service providers. On the other hand, cybersecurity requirements could create barriers for digitization. 
Organizations will be discouraged from engaging in new digitization initiatives or expanding existing 
ones and thereby destructing jobs for general IT service providers. In addition, the severe shortage of 
cybersecurity labor (Zadelhoff 2017) will limit organizations from engaging in digitization initiatives 
even when they are economically viable. The increased entry barrier to digitization will therefore 
negatively influence the employment of IT service providers. With competing influences, this study 
empirically examines how the enactment of SBNLs affects the employment of IT service providers 
(RQ). 
We exploit the staggered passages of state-level SBNLs, i.e., passages that happen at different 
points of time, to identify their effect on the employment of IT service providers. Using a difference-
                                                          
19 Other notification entities typically include state attorney generals, consumer report agencies, third-parties that own the data. 
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in-difference design, we found that enactments of SBNL reduce employment for larger and more 
mature IT service firms, but have no effect towards smaller and younger firms. The main results are 
obtained after controlling for various state-level economic variables (unemployment rate, personal 
income growth rate, housing price index). Since our analysis suggests state economic and political 
conditions do not predict the passage of the laws, SBNLs enactments can be viewed as an 
approximate random assignment. Several robustness checks were conducted by including controls 
such as local sentiments about data breaches and the number of compromised records, and excluding 
observations around the 2008 financial crisis, as well as observations from California and 
Massachusetts, where IT industries are more vibrant. To further alleviate identification concerns, we 
tested the main model using a placebo timing and a placebo industry. 
This paper appeals to three groups of audiences. First, the study will add to the economics of 
digitization literature, which has traditionally focused on cost reduction through digitization 
(Goldfarb and Tucker 2019). While cybersecurity adds cost to digitization, the issue lies in measuring 
its impact on the digital economy. The staggered passage of SBNLs provides a unique opportunity to 
identify the impact of cybersecurity on digitization. We show that the raised cybersecurity standards 
may become entry barriers for digitization, as reflected by the employment reduction of larger and 
more mature IT service providers. While prior literature has revealed the social costs of digitization 
(Chan and Ghose 2013; Chan et al. 2019), this study documents an economic cost of digitization. 
Second, this paper adds to the cybersecurity literature by revealing the economic implications of 
legislative mitigation strategies. Prior cybersecurity literature has shown that cybersecurity legislation 
reduces security threats (Hui et al. 2017; Kwon and Johnson 2014; Romanosky et al. 2011), whereas 
the broader and unintended economic impact of such legislation is understudied. With cyber threats 
becoming more severe (Sen 2018), an emerging stream of literature focuses on whether cybersecurity 
investments can effectively prevent data breaches in key industries, such as the healthcare industry 
(Angst et al. 2017; Kwon and Johnson 2013; Kwon and Johnson 2014; Kwon and Johnson 2018). 
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This paper takes a different focus and quantifies the economic impact of variation in the regulatory 
environment of cybersecurity investments. 
Third, this paper will shed light on legislative discussions regarding cybersecurity. Similar 
discussions exist around privacy laws. For example, previous research unfolded that the compliance 
cost associated with healthcare privacy laws discourages electronic medical record adoption in 
hospitals (Miller and Tucker 2009). We focus on a different set of state-level legislation and explore 
beyond the healthcare industry. While politicians face increasing consumer pressure in holding 
organizations accountable for data breaches, it is also important to understand the costs and benefits 
of these laws to the critical areas of the economy such as employment. With all states now having 
passed SBNLs, this paper will add to the discussions of a federal-level SBNL. 
The rest of the paper will proceed as follows. We will first provide some background of SBNLs, 
and show that state-level economic, political, and legal environments do not predict passages of 
SBNLs. We will then explain the data sources used in the study, IT service industries classifications, 
firm-age and size classifications, and measurement of various constructs. Specifications of the 
generalized difference-in-difference (DID) design will be discussed. The main analyses will be 
followed by various robustness and placebo tests. We will conclude with discussions of limitations 
and implications of the study. 
4.2 Institutional background 
The state-level security breach notification law (SBNL) was first introduced in California in 
2002. By the end of 2018, all states have passed some version of the law. Figure 4.1 depicts the 
number of years since the enactment till the end of 2016. All SBNLs require organizations to notify 
customers in a timely manner when their personal identifiable information is breached through the 
organizations. Many states impose hard deadline such as 30 or 45 days to notify the affected party 
after a breach is discovered. Notification channels include written notice, email, phone call, etc. Some 
states allow exemptions if after investigation the company can provide written proof that the security 
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breach will not harm the consumers. Apart from notifying customers, SBNLs often include 
notifications to state attorney generals, consumer report agencies and third-parties that own the data.  
Most of these notifications are only necessary if the number of compromised records exceeds a 
certain threshold. Personal identifiable information (PII) in SBNLs include name, social security 
number, driver’s license number, state ID number, account number, credit/debit card number, pin, 
passwords. Some states define PII more broadly to include medical information and biometric 
information (e.g. fingerprint). A few states allow private citizens to pursue civil litigations against the 
entities that fail to comply with SBNLs. A federal-level SBNL was proposed in 2015 (Shear and 
Singer 2015), but did not pass the congress.  
Figure 4.1 Years since Enactment of Security Breach Notification Law till the End of 2016 
 
Needless to say, SBNLs were passed in order to mitigate cyber threats. More recent enactment 
of SBNLs may be partly due to the high-profile breach cases, such as the incident with Equifax in 
2017. Because if penalties are associated with failure to comply, the passage of SBNLs puts a 
coercive institutional pressure on firms to update their cybersecurity practices or initiate new projects 
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that enable compliance. Although the passage of SBNLs creates a suitable quasi-experimental setting 
to study the impact of cybersecurity initiatives on the digital growth, a key question is whether or not 
the passages of those laws resemble a random assignment of treatment. Acknowledging that a full 
random assignment is far from the realities of policymaking, our first step in the study was to ensure 
that the known factors influencing state policy did not systematically influence the enactments of 
SBNL. 
Table 4.1 provides an exogeneity check for the SBNL passages. We investigate whether a state’s 
macroeconomic, political economy, or legal conditions predict the passage of the SBNL, following 
Appel et al. (2019). The SBNL dummy is set to 1 if the law is passed in the state, and o otherwise. 
The Democratic and Republican control (Dem/Rep_State) dummies indicate a party controls both the 
legislative and executive branches. The dummies equal 1 if both branches are controlled by the 
democratic/republican party, respectively, and equal to 0 for split controls. The legal ranking 
measures the business friendliness of the state legal system through the lawsuit climate survey 
conducted by the US Chamber of Commerce. The local sentiment of data breaches 
(GSV_Data_Breach) is measured by the Google search volume of the keyword “data breach”. To 
avoid over-fitting, we did not include the state fixed effects in the logistic regression. The non-
significant coefficients in Table 4.1 suggest that persistent state characteristics that may correlate with 
the passage of SBNLs do not undermine the validity of our difference-in-difference design. 
Linear regressions with inclusion and exclusion of predictors following Appel et al. (2019) 
produce similar results (Appendix D). We choose to report the logistic regression in Table 4.1, since 
linear probability models can potentially give rise to estimated probabilities that exceed 1 or fall 
below 0. While treatments in quasi-experiments are not randomized by and large (Angrist and 






















Year-quarter FE Yes 
Observations 323 
Notes. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
The sample size is small compared to the main 
analyses in Table 3, because in some quarters, no 
state passed the law, and year-quarter fixed effects 
perfectly predict the SBNL dummy. These 
observations are dropped in the logistic regression. 
State-year-quarter observations after the law 
passages are dropped, following Appel et al. (2019). 
4.3 Method 
4.3.1 Data and Sample 
State-level employment data is obtained from the Census Bureau’s Quarterly Workforce 
Indicators (QWI). For each state-quarter, the QWI reports employment data aggregated by firm age, 
size and four-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). The QWI dataset 
divides firm age into five groups: 0-1, 2-3, 4-5, 6-10, 11+. In measuring the impact on employment, 
we collapse the firm age categories to three: 0-3, 4-10, 11+ years following Appel et al. (2019), where 
firms aged 0-3 are considered startups. The QWI dataset divides firm sizes based on the number of 
employees: 0-19, 20-49, 50-249, 250-499, 500+. For symmetry with firm age categorization, we 
collapsed firm sizes into three categories: 0-49, 50-499, 500+. 
To identify IT service industries, we follow the classification by the Census Bureau using the 
four-digit NAICS code (Haltiwanger et al. 2014) (see Table 4.2). Signed and effective dates of 
SBNLs are collected from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) and Perkins Coie. 
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The sample period is from 2001 to 2016, one year before the first state SBNL enactment, and up to 
the latest QWI data availability. The main analysis with firm-age categorization has 3358 state-year-
quarter observations. The sample size varies for subsequent analyses based on data availability. 
Computers and communication industries are used as a placebo in additional identification analyses.  
Table 4.2. Industry classification 
NAICS (2017) Industry Description 
IT Services 
5112 Software publishers 
5191 Internet publishing and broadcasting 
5182 Data processing, hosting, and related services 
5415 Computer systems design and related services 
Computers & Communications 
3341 Computer and peripheral equipment manufacturing 
3342 Communications equipment manufacturing 
3344 Semiconductor and other electronic component manufacturing 
3345 Navigational, measuring, electromedical, and control instruments manufacturing 
5179 Other telecommunications 
Notes. The NAICS classification do not specify cybersecurity service providers. Internet services industries were treated as IT service 
providers. Computers & communications industries were used as a placebo industry in table 6. 
4.3.2 Measures 
The dependent variable, employment in IT service firms is measured as the natural logarithm of 
one plus the number of full quarter employment (emps in QWI), i.e., the number of jobs that are held 
on both the first and last day of the quarter with the same employer. Notably, employment by IT 
service providers includes but is not limited to IT labor. However, since QWI data are aggregated on 
the plant level, for a large and diversified company with multiple subsidiaries, most of its non-IT 
employment is not included in our data if the IT subsidiary has a different physical location. 
Nevertheless, even within an IT subsidiary, there are some non-IT employees in the back office, 
which cannot be purged out due to data limitations. At any rate, non-IT employment change in IT 
service industries shall also reflect the change in the supply of digital goods and services. When an IT 
service provider has more business opportunities, it will hire more IT as well as non-IT staffs. 
Our main explanatory variable, 𝑺𝑩𝑵𝑳𝒔𝒕, is an indicator set to one if SBNL has been signed into 
law in state 𝑠 on or before year-quarter 𝑡, and zero otherwise. In a pilot study, we codified SBNLs 
based on the five dimensions in Ashraf and Sunder (2018): a) whether a notification law imposes a 
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hard deadline following the discovery of a data breach; b) if a law requires firms to disclose a data 
breach only if it is determined to reasonably likely to cause harm to the victims; c) if a law requires 
notification to the attorney general or other state agencies; d) if a law allows private citizens to pursue 
litigation against a firm that fails to comply with the data breach disclosure law; and e) if a law 
defines personally identifiable information more broadly than general. While the codification is a 
more detailed depiction of the law, we found no significant effect towards IT employment in the main 
and robustness analyses, suggesting that passage of SBNL play a more dominant role than details of 
the law. The codification is hence omitted in subsequent analyses. 
For control variables, we obtained state-level quarterly unemployment rate, personal income 
growth rate from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The housing price index, obtained from 
the Federal Housing Finance Agency, is measured by the average price changes in repeated sales or 
refinancing on the same properties. While the underlying assumption of natural experiments is that 
control and treatment groups have similar characteristics except for the treatment, it would be naïve to 
assume different states possess identical economic backgrounds (e.g. Wyoming and New York). 
Hence, the three variables serve as controls for state-level economic conditions.  
4.3.3 Specification 
In an ideal experimental setting at the firm level, identical SBNL treatments would be randomly 
assigned to each individual firm, and employment at the firm level can be measured at different points 
in time, so that we can precisely identify how SBNLs affect different types of IT service providers 
over time. In lieu of the ideal setting, analyses are conducted on a state-year-quarter level following a 
quasi-experimental design, where enactments of SBNL (treatment) approximates random assignment 
(Table 4.1). 
We employ a generalized difference-in-differences (DID) specification at the state-year-quarter 
level following Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003). In this case, an event study would not accurately 
capture the effect of SBNLs due to the lack of control and treatment groups, whereas a simple DID 
specification would not be compatible with the staggered nature of legislation enactments. Recent 
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studies that involve staggered exogenous shocks have used similar specifications (Appel et al. 2019; 
Ashraf and Sunder 2018; Chan et al. 2019). Our main analysis uses the following equation. 
𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑡 = 𝛼𝑠 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿 ⋅ 𝑆𝐵𝑁𝐿𝑠𝑡 + 𝛾𝑋𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑠𝑡, 
where 𝛼𝑠 is a state fixed effect, which controls for state characteristics that do not vary over the 
sample period. 𝛼𝑡 is a year-quarter fixed effect, which absorbs aggregate shocks affecting all states. 
𝑋𝑠𝑡 are control variables (state-level unemployment rate, personal income growth rate, housing price 
index). 𝜖𝑠𝑡 is an error term. Finally, the coefficient 𝛿 is the DID estimator for the effect of SBNL 
enactments towards the employment of IT service firms. 
This specification allows the same states to be part of the treatment and control groups at different 
points in time. The treatment group consists of states passing a law at year-quarter 𝑡, i.e., the states 
experiencing the exogenous shock. The control group includes all states not passing a law at year-
quarter 𝑡, regardless of whether they have or will pass a law (Angrist and Pischke 2009; Bertrand and 
Mullainathan 2003). This means the SBNL dummy may be equal to 1 and the state can still be in the 
control group. In essence, the generalized DID design enables the construction of a control group 
even when all states have (eventually) passed the law, as long as the passages are staggered.  
4.4 Results 
The main results (Table 4.3) show that the employment of IT service industries decreases 
following the passages of SBNL relative to states not passing the law, suggesting an adverse effect of 
SBNLs towards digitization. Column 1 and 5 show an overall decline across firm age and size 
categories. The two columns produce different coefficients because QWI, for privacy reasons, reports 
missing data for industries with low employment number, and aggregating employment data from 
different industries make it appear as if there is no data missing. Columns 2, 3, and 6 produce 
insignificant coefficients, suggesting that SBNLs have no obvious impact on the employment by 
newer and smaller firms. The negative effect is significant for firms aged eleven years or older 
(column 4), and for medium and large firms with at least 50 employees (column 7 and 8). Subsequent 
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tests reveal the result on mid-size firms (column 7) is not robust (robustness tests on column 7 are not 
reported for brevity). Hence, the overall decline is mainly driven by mature (11+ years) and large 
(500+ employees) firms.  
This concentrated results on large and mature firms are likely because younger IT service firms 
are more agile relative to mature ones, and hence are more likely to swiftly cater to the portion of 
customer firms that keep their digitization projects with higher cybersecurity standards. Therefore, the 
results may suggest that the supply of cybersecurity compliance services is concentrated in small and 
new firms, hence shielding them from the overall adverse impacts of a decrease in non-cybersecurity 
service demand.  
Table 4.3. Main results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Firm Age (Years since founding)  Firm Size (# of Employees) 
 All ages 0-3 4-10 11+  All sizes 0-49 50-499 500+ 
          
SBNL -0.058** -0.061 -0.033 -0.056**  -0.069* -0.035 -0.098** -0.119** 
 (0.029) (0.071) (0.053) (0.026)  (0.035) (0.030) (0.038) (0.054) 
Unemployment -0.018* -0.011 -0.001 -0.020*  -0.019* -0.014* -0.030 -0.023 
 (0.009) (0.017) (0.015) (0.011)  (0.009) (0.007) (0.019) (0.019) 
PI Growth Rate 0.366 0.244 0.418 0.455  0.290 0.106 0.056 -0.261 
(0.238) (0.742) (0.359) (0.327)  (0.243) (0.165) (0.396) (0.650) 
Housing_Price 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000  0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
          
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358  3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358 
R-squared 0.995 0.971 0.980 0.992  0.994 0.996 0.981 0.906 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered by the state are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. PI growth rate stands for personal income growth rate. 
With results mainly driven by mature (age 11+) and large firms (500+ employees), the robustness 
checks in Table 4.4 focus on these firms exclusively. We found consistent results under various 
specifications and sample periods. In column 3, we controlled for the natural logarithm of one plus 
the number of compromised records (starting from 2005, from Privacy Rights Clearinghouse) in each 
state and year-quarter to ensure that the level of actual cyber threats, irrespective of legislative 
pressure, do not drive the findings. In column 4, we controlled for the local sentiment for breaches, 
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measured by the Google search volume (GSV) index for the search term “data breach” (starting from 
2004). Since the 2008 financial crisis may have affected all 50 states unevenly, we excluded data 
from the last quarter in 2007 till the second quarter in 2009 (column 1), and test for post-crisis results 
(Column 2-4). As IT industries in California and Massachusetts are more vibrant, analyses excluding 
both states (Column 5) suggest the results are not driven by individual states. Column 6 reports 
weighted regressions with weights based on the natural logarithm of each state’s employment in 
2001, the first year in the sample. Finally, we tested all models using beginning of quarter and end of 
quarter employment (emp and empend in QWI, respectively). We also tested the models using the un-
collapsed firm age and size categories in QWI. The alternative employment measures and analyses 
with un-collapsed categories produce similar results20. 
To inspect the timeline of the impact of SBNLs, we added additional dummies in the main 
regression model (Table 4.5), where 𝑆𝐵𝑁𝐿[𝑖𝑄]𝑠𝑡 is set to one if SBNL is effective 𝑖 quarters before 
year-quarter 𝑡 for state 𝑠, and zero otherwise. 𝑆𝐵𝑁𝐿[4𝑄+]𝑠𝑡 is set to one if SBNL is effective four 
quarters or more before year-quarter 𝑡 for state 𝑠, and zero otherwise. We observe an increase in 
effect size following the event quarter, with the results concentrated on more mature and larger firms 
(see also Figure 4.2), similar to our main findings. The significant negative coefficients for  
𝑆𝐵𝑁𝐿[4𝑄+]𝑠𝑡 and the large effect size suggests the negative impact would likely persist beyond the 
fourth quarter following the enactments of the law. 
To further alleviate identification concerns, we tested the main model using a placebo timing and 
a placebo industry (Table 4.6). Placebo timing is set at twelve quarters before the event (column 1, 2) 
following Appel et al. (2019). The non-significant DID estimators mitigate concerns that confounding 
events coincide with the SBNLs’ enactment timing were driving the main results. Placebo tests with 
the false timing for other age and size categories produced similar non-significant coefficients, and 
are omitted for brevity. 
                                                          
20 The results using alternative employment measures and un-collapsed firm age and size categories are available upon request. 
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Table 4.4. Panel A. Robustness check I. (Firm age=11+) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Exclude-
Crisis 
Post-Crisis Post-Crisis Post-Crisis No CA&MA Weighted 
Regression 
       
SBNL -0.062** -0.095* -0.095* -0.095** -0.051* -0.080*** 
 (0.026) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.027) (0.025) 
Unemployment -0.020 -0.022* -0.022* -0.022* -0.020* -0.021* 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) 
Personal_Income_Growth 0.572* 0.331 0.336 0.330 0.392 0.657 
 (0.318) (0.476) (0.470) (0.478) (0.323) (0.450) 
Housing_Price -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(Data_Breach)   0.001    
   (0.001)    
GSV_Data_Breach    0.001   
    (0.002)   
       
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,008 1,719 1,719 1,719 3,259 3,358 
R-squared 0.992 0.997 0.997 0.997 0.991 0.990 
 
Panel B. Robustness Check II (# of Employees=500+) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Exclude-Crisis Post-Crisis Post-Crisis Post-Crisis No CA&MA Weighted 
Regression 
       
SBNL -0.131** -0.168*** -0.168*** -0.167*** -0.109* -0.133** 
 (0.054) (0.062) (0.062) (0.062) (0.056) (0.058) 
Unemployment -0.021 -0.024 -0.024 -0.024 -0.021 -0.031* 
 (0.020) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) 
Personal_Income_Growth -0.219 0.319 0.344 0.320 -0.319 0.535 
 (0.705) (0.617) (0.598) (0.615) (0.647) (0.737) 
Housing_Price 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Ln(Data_Breach)   0.003    
   (0.003)    
GSV_Data_Breach    -0.001   
    (0.003)   
       
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,017 1,720 1,720 1,720 3,267 2,444 
R-squared 0.898 0.965 0.965 0.965 0.912 0.985 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, 
respectively. Crisis is defined as the financial crisis from Q4 in 2007 to Q2 in 2009. CA and MA are short for California and Massachusetts. 
GSV_Data_Breach stands for the Google search volume index of “data breach” on the state level (starting from 2004). 
We chose the computers and communications industry as a placebo since it is most similar to the 
IT service industry (see Table 4.2), and the two industries will likely follow similar business cycles. 
Hence, the placebo test can potentially address concerns about omitted variables that correlate with 
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the IT business cycles and the passages of SBNL. Unlike IT service firms, however, manufacturers of 
personal computers and cellphones are unlikely to be affected by the law changes, as everyday 
consumers are certainly not personally subject to SBNL compliance. In addition, cloud-based 
computing has also reduced the demand for a hardware update in digitization. The industry 
classifications follow Haltiwanger et al. (2014). Since the computers and communications industries 
are predominantly in the manufacturing business, it is more labor-intensive and should be more 
sensitive to macro changes that would alter its employment. However, except for column 7 in Table 
6, all DID estimators in columns 3-8 are non-significant, suggesting that SBNLs have no significant 
impact on employment in the placebo industry, thus alleviating concerns that macro conditions that 
reduce employment across different industries were driving the results.  
Overall, the results show no significant effect using either the placebo timing or the placebo 
industry, which gives us more confidence to attribute the change in employment of IT service 
industries to SBNL enactments. Finally, while the parallel-trends assumption in DID is ultimately 
untestable, there is some indirect evidence. We found no significant difference in the evolution of 
employment in treated and controlled states prior to the passage of SBNL for all firms (confidence 
intervals in Figure 4.2 and Appendix E before the event intersect with the horizontal zero lines). 
Figure 4.2 Evolution of Employment by IT Service Providers 
The figures below plot the evolution of IT employment at mature IT firms (left graph) and large IT firms (right 
graph) in treatment groups relative to the control groups. The 𝑦-axis represents the coefficients on the dummy 
variables indicating the timing of breach notification law passage and the 𝑥-axis represents the event quarter 
centered around the quarter when breach notification law is signed (Event Quarter=0). The dots represent the 
point estimates and the vertical bars represent the 95% confidence intervals (see also table 4.5). 



























Table 4.5. Dynamic effects of security breach notification laws  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Firm Age (Years since foundation) Firm Size (# of Employees) 
 All Ages 0-3 4-10 11+ All sizes 0-49 50-499 500+ 
         
SBNL[0Q] -0.034** -0.028 -0.018 -0.040** -0.037** -0.014 -0.032 -0.018 
 (0.016) (0.045) (0.040) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.033) (0.067) 
SBNL[1Q] -0.036** -0.034 -0.031 -0.038** -0.040* -0.020 -0.055 -0.060 
 (0.018) (0.052) (0.041) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.034) (0.038) 
SBNL[2Q] -0.038* -0.060 -0.022 -0.038** -0.043* -0.020 -0.069* -0.058 
 (0.019) (0.054) (0.046) (0.018) (0.022) (0.020) (0.036) (0.039) 
SBNL[3Q] -0.044* -0.043 -0.033 -0.047** -0.050* -0.031 -0.048 -0.079* 
 (0.022) (0.079) (0.045) (0.021) (0.026) (0.023) (0.035) (0.044) 
SBNL[4Q+] -0.074** -0.074 -0.038 -0.072** -0.089* -0.043 -0.125** -0.150** 
 (0.036) (0.086) (0.067) (0.033) (0.044) (0.038) (0.048) (0.066) 
Unemployment -0.018** -0.011 -0.001 -0.020* -0.019** -0.014* -0.031 -0.023 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.015) (0.011) (0.009) (0.007) (0.019) (0.019) 
PI growth rate 0.341 0.220 0.410 0.431 0.259 0.093 0.011 -0.309 
 (0.240) (0.735) (0.361) (0.327) (0.249) (0.169) (0.403) (0.653) 
Housing_Price 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001** 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
         
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358 3,358 
R-squared 0.995 0.971 0.980 0.992 0.995 0.996 0.981 0.906 
Notes. Robust standard errors clustered by state are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
level, respectively. 𝑆𝐵𝑁𝐿[𝑖𝑄]𝑠𝑡 is set to one if SBNL is effective 𝑖 quarters before year-quarter 𝑡 for state 𝑠, and zero otherwise. PI growth 
rate stands for personal income growth rate. 
 
Table 4.6. Placebo tests 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Placebo Timing = −12  Placebo Industry: Computers and Communications 
















          
SBNL_Placeo -0.077 -0.093        
 (0.051) (0.060)        
SBNL    -0.074 -0.014 -0.011 -0.057 0.179** 0.052 
    (0.124) (0.139) (0.057) (0.052) (0.086) (0.087) 
Unemployment -0.026* -0.022  0.008 0.026 -0.048** -0.033 0.038 -0.097*** 
 (0.014) (0.019)  (0.048) (0.055) (0.021) (0.022) (0.028) (0.029) 
Personal_Income_Growth -0.222 -0.262  4.050** 0.408 -0.725 -0.607 2.008** 1.472 
 (0.663) (0.627)  (1.746) (1.595) (0.652) (0.818) (0.806) (1.170) 
Housing_Price -0.000 0.000  -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002** 0.000 -0.009* 
 (0.001) (0.001)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) 
          
State Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Quarter Fixed Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,358 3,358  2,863 3,058 3,367 3,291 3,194 3,361 
R-squared 0.899 0.905  0.863 0.883 0.913 0.977 0.941 0.899 
Notes. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Placebo timing is set 





With the continuous increase in digitization activities coinciding with the rise of cybersecurity 
threats and the cost of combating data breaches, a lingering question has been one related to whether 
or not complying with institutional pressures of addressing cybersecurity threats hinders digital 
growth. Through a natural experiment, this paper empirically measures the economic impact of the 
enactment of security breach notification laws toward IT service industries. By exploiting the 
staggered passages of SBNLs, we employ a difference-in-differences design to identify the effect of 
SBNL enactments on the employment of IT service providers. The results show that passages of 
SBNL significantly reduces employment for larger and more mature IT service providers, suggesting 
that digitization is slowed down by cybersecurity requirements. 
Before discussing the implications of the study, we first acknowledge two limitations. First, 
inherent to the nature of DID design and limitations of aggregated data, the study does not provide 
explicit insights about the exact nature of employment dynamics in providers that cater to 
cybersecurity services versus those who don’t. Our key argument is that SBNL enactment reduces the 
demand for general IT, thus reducing its supply, as reflected in the employment reduction in IT 
service providers. However, to directly measure the supply and demand of digitization, further firm-
level scrutiny is required to better understand the nature of the overall decrease in IT service 
employment as a result of passing SBNLs. 
The second limitation of the study is inherent to the broad unit of analysis, where we implicitly 
assumed different states are comparable without the SBNL shocks. This assumption can be 
challenged by comparing states with vastly different economic landscapes (e.g. New York and 
Wyoming). While we have controlled for three macro-economic variables, there are likely other 
uncontrolled covariates (e.g. the level of automation). To better address the issue, future studies with 
employment data on more granular geographic levels, e.g., the county level, can form a better 
selection of counterfactuals. While each state may not be entirely comparable, neighboring counties 
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along state borders are very similar communities, where they experience SBNL shocks at different 
points in time. 
Despite the limitations, this study has two implications for the literature. First, it adds to the 
digital economics literature that has traditionally focused on cost reduction through digitization. This 
study quantifies an added cost of digitization, i.e., cybersecurity. The advancement of digitization has 
vastly reduced the cost to search for, replicate, and transport data (Goldfarb and Tucker 2019). While 
these lowered costs create countless benefits, they also increase the exposure of sensitive data. To 
mitigate the threats, policy-makers introduced SBNLs to stimulate cybersecurity initiatives by firms. 
However, we have found evidence that in order to avoid the compliance costs of SBNLs, firms are 
disincentivized to engage in digitization, as reflected by employment reduction in service providers of 
digitization. The digital economics literature is closely related to the IS field as IT adoption and IT 
investment are both tied with digitization. As such, this paper serves as a bridge between 
cybersecurity literature and the economics of digitization. 
Second, this paper links cybersecurity with general IT. Behavioral security studies have addressed 
relationships between organizational risk mitigation mechanisms and psychological behavioral 
intentions (Bulgurcu et al. 2010; D'Arcy et al. 2009; Siponen and Vance 2010; Willison and 
Warkentin 2013). Organizational-level cybersecurity studies largely focus on risk mitigation through 
cybersecurity investments (Angst et al. 2017; Kwon and Johnson 2018), as well as the value of 
cybersecurity investments (Bose and Leung 2019; Gordon et al. 2010). State-level cybersecurity 
studies explore the effectiveness of cybersecurity legislation (Murciano-Goroff 2019; Romanosky et 
al. 2011). This study relates to these prior studies since state-level cybersecurity legislation affects 
firm-level cybersecurity initiatives, which in turn influence individual-level behavioral intentions. 
This paper differs from existing studies in that it focuses on the broader economic angle of 
cybersecurity. While digitization necessitates cybersecurity, we study how cybersecurity impacts the 




For policy-makers, this study reveals an unintended consequence of SBNLs. The current debates 
of SBNLs center on whether certain provisions in the laws are effective in mitigating data breaches, 
and whether there is a need for a federal-level SBNL. This study sheds light on these discussions by 
providing a view of the unintended aspects of this legislation. Understanding the economic 
consequences of well-intentioned legislative agendas that affect firm-level cybersecurity initiatives on 









CHAPTER V: CONCLUSION 
While cybersecurity continues to pose threats to organizations, one of the biggest challenges 
for organizations is to justify cybersecurity investment as “a strategic investment in reduction of 
corporate risk, and a positive contribution to the realization of business value.”21 To this end, we 
document the business values of internal (infrastructural) and external (innovation-oriented) 
cybersecurity investments in the first two essays, respectively. In the first essay, we find that the 
value of infrastructural cybersecurity investments is best leveraged through complementary 
investments in cybersecurity labor and evaluated within a socially relative framework. We also 
reveal the reduction of cost of capital as one avenue for business value creation. In essay 2, we 
find that an innovation-oriented (forward-looking) cybersecurity investments (CVC) also 
contributes to firm values, especially for IT firms in more recent years. Together, the two essays 
provide a complementary picture of internal and external cybersecurity investments. 
Moving beyond the micro-underpinnings of cybersecurity in organizations, we study the 
broader impact of cybersecurity toward general IT. Apart from increased spending in 
cybersecurity, another (related) trend in cybersecurity is the more stringent regulatory 
environment in cybersecurity. In championing these regulations to mitigate cyber threats, it is 
important to quantify the unintended economic consequences of well-intentioned regulations, so 
that policy-makers can make more informed decisions. In essay 3, we find that enactments of 
security breach notification laws reduce employment in large and mature IT service firms, 
suggesting that cybersecurity laws can have a negative impact toward the digital economy.  
While the three essays cover a wide range of topics in cybersecurity, they are inherently 
linked by the fact that infrastructural cybersecurity investments are closely related to innovations 




in cybersecurity, both of which are often instigated by cybersecurity legislation. Overall, the essays 
document the value of cybersecurity investments and the cost of cybersecurity legislation. In doing 
so, the dissertation covers a wide range of institutional entities that both shape and are impacted by 
the cybersecurity ecosystem. 
The dissertation contributes to several streams of literature. Essay 1 and 2 add to the studies on 
the business value of cybersecurity investment. While the preventive value of cybersecurity 
investment is well-documented, particularly in the healthcare industry (Kwon and Johnson 2013; 
Kwon and Johnson 2014), the bottom-line value measured by more tangible accounting indices and 
the value-creation mechanism are not clear. Essay 1 connects cybersecurity to the book-keeping 
indices of sustained performance, ties them into the deeper strategic efforts of talent acquisition in 
competitive markets, makes them relevant to the institutional positioning of a firm relative to its 
peers, and positions them as a significant factor in connecting to stakeholders and accessing 
competitive sources of financing. It also echoes recent studies on the preventive value of 
cybersecurity investments by linking talent recruitment with substantive cybersecurity investments 
(Angst et al. 2017; Kwon and Johnson 2018). 
Essay 2 adds to the business value of cybersecurity investment literature by revealing the value of 
innovation in cybersecurity as an area that is predominantly believed to be costly but not value-
generating. More generally, it also contributes to the business value of IT literature, where the main 
focus has been on infrastructural and talent investments (Brynjolfsson and Hitt 1996; Tambe and Hitt 
2012) and the value of investments in IT innovation is understudied. 
Finally, essay 3 adds to the digital economics literature by revealing cybersecurity as an inherent 
economic cost attached to digitization, in contrast to the well-documented cost reduction nature of 
going digital (Goldfarb and Tucker 2019). Essay 3 also contributes to the cybersecurity literature by 
linking cybersecurity with general IT. While existing cybersecurity literature largely focuses on the 
micro-underpinning of individual behavior and organizational initiatives related to the effectiveness 
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of cybersecurity practices, we broaden the picture by investigating how cybersecurity impacts general 
IT.  
The dissertation also has immediate implications for practitioners. As security executives struggle 
to tie cybersecurity to companies’ general IT strategy and justifying the cost of cybersecurity 
spending (with no direct contribution to companies’ revenue), we provide empirical evidence on the 
magnitude of the business value and the channels through which cybersecurity values are created. We 
also point to the value of investing in forward-looking, innovation-oriented cybersecurity. For 
policymakers of cybersecurity laws, apart from considering the effectiveness in mitigating cyber 
threats, we have shown that the unintended economic consequences of cybersecurity legislation 
should also be included in the debate. As more privacy and security laws are introduced on the state 
and federal level and spending in cybersecurity continue to grow, our studies provide some baseline 
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Appendix A: Keywords List 
Table A1. Keywords Used to Search for Data Breaches and Cybersecurity investments and to Train the 
Machine Learning Algorithm used to Identify Skillsets 
Data Breaches and Cybersecurity Investments Cybersecurity Skillsets 
security risk management 
computer security cybersecurity 
breach cyber 
security breach cyber defense 
information security breach incident response 
privacy vulnerability assessment 
threat threat analysis 
attack exploitation analysis 
protect cyber operation 
protection cyber investigation 
vulnerability digital forensics 
cyber attack authentication 
computer break-in compliance 
break-in assurance 
computer attack security 
network intrusion protect 
data theft incident 
identity theft firewall 
phishing confidentiality 
hacker integrity 
computer virus availability 
cyber fraud access control 
denial of service cyberspace 
 defense 




Appendix B: First Stage of 2SLS Estimation 
  SS1: Under-performing firms SS2: On-par firms (high risk) SS3: On-par firms (low risk) SS4: Over-performing firms 
 DV= PECIs TR TR*PECIs PECIs TR TR*PECIs PECIs TR TR*PECIs PECIs TR TR*PECIs 



































































































































































































































































































Firm controls YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Adj. R-Squared 0.68 0.72 0.63 0.71 0.62 0.68 0.72 0.73 0.64 0.59 0.64 0.67 
Observations 884 718 992 606 
Notes. PECIs stands for publicly emphasizing cybersecurity investments, TR for talent recruitment, ex_IT for previous year IT investment, ind_IT for industry IT investment, Tax for industry tax ratio, 
Surplus for the industry-operating surplus, MER for the industry material-energy input ratio, SER for the industry service-energy input ratio, IEX for the industry import-export value, SBNL for security 





Appendix C: WACC Estimation 








where 𝐸 is the market value of firm equity, 𝐷 is the market value of the firm’s debt, 𝑟𝑒 is the firm’s 
cost of equity capital, 𝑟𝐷 is the firm’s cost of debt capital (retrieved from Bloomberg Financial), and 
𝑇 is the firm’s rate of corporate taxation. 𝑟𝐸  is the expected return from holding the firm’s equity 
using a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (Lintner 1975): 
𝑟𝐸  = 𝑟𝐹 + 𝛽𝐸.( 𝑟𝑀 −  𝑟𝐹) 
where 𝑟𝐹 is the risk-free rate of investment (10-year US treasury bond rate), 𝑟𝑀, is the return on the 
market portfolio, and  𝛽𝐸 is the firm’s systematic risk (
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑟𝑀,   𝑟𝐹)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑟𝑀)
), estimated from COMPUSTAT.  
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Appendix D: Exogeneity check using OLS 
Table D1. OLS regressions (linear probability model) 
DV=SBNL (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Unemployment Rate 0.000 0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.001 -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.010) (0.003) (0.013) (0.003) (0.012) (0.003) (0.012) 
Personal Income Growth -0.305 -0.775 -0.303 -0.845 -0.290 -0.940 -0.278 -0.892 
 (1.731) (1.270) (1.713) (1.219) (1.735) (1.224) (1.755) (1.276) 
Housing Price Index 0.027 0.061 0.031** 0.041 0.026* 0.028 0.026* 0.030 
 (0.024) (0.054) (0.014) (0.056) (0.013) (0.055) (0.013) (0.050) 
Dem State     -0.000 0.004 -0.000 0.004 
     (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) 
Rep State   0.010 0.036 0.008 0.042 0.008 0.043 
   (0.023) (0.031) (0.021) (0.034) (0.021) (0.033) 
Legal Rank   -0.025** -0.044 -0.026** -0.040 -0.026** -0.041 
   (0.009) (0.026) (0.010) (0.027) (0.010) (0.028) 
GSV Data Breach       -0.002 -0.004 
       (0.004) (0.006) 
Year-Quarter FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
State FE No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Observations 1,250 1,248 1,242 1,240 1,235 1,233 1,235 1,233 


















Appendix E: Evolution of employment by smaller and younger IT service firms 
The figures below plot the evolution of IT employment at smaller and younger IT service firms in treatment 
groups relative to the control groups. The 𝑦-axis represents the coefficients on the dummy variables indicating 
the timing of breach notification law passage and the 𝑥-axis represents the event quarter centered around the 
quarter when breach notification law is signed (Event Quarter=0). The dots represent the point estimates and the 
vertical bars represent the 95% confidence intervals (see also table 5). 
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